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Is the White Paper black enough?
The much-awaited White Paper on South African fisheries (excerpted on page 41 of this issue of
SAMUDRA), in the making for over two and a half years, and released on 19 June, was expected to
mainly address the anomalies in the country’s fisheries, especially the distribution of marine
resources, which is highly skewed in favour of whites. At the outset, the White Paper seeks to
ensure inter-generational equity and long-term sustainability, and pledges to act as the custodian
of all marine resources, which will be treated as a national heritage. Unlike in the past, the rights
to utilize living marine resources will also be allocated in a fair and equitable manner. The new
policy is seen as contributing to the long-term vision embodied in the Macro Economic Strategy of
the country’s Department of Finance, namely, the creation of a competitive, fast-growing economy
that generates enough jobs, and redistributes income and opportunities in favour of the poor.
The White Paper acknowledges the concentration of access rights in the hands of a few whites. It
considers this a testimony to unequal opportunities and sees in it a strong argument for the future
broadening of participation. The White Paper seeks to dismantle the existing system of permits and
quotas. It proposes that access rights be converted into “real rights”, which could be purchased
through a transparent and competitive process, against the payment of an appropriate fee based
on quota, catch or effort.
The new policy moots short-term leasing of rights to those who are not keen on acquiring permanent
rights. But it is not clear who would really benefit. It seems that both blacks and whites could profit.
The whites, however, stand to gain more, since they have well-entrenched interests in the industry
and have the financial muscle to successfully participate in the lease market.
From the point of view of the Macro Economic Strategy, however, no attempt has been made to
discuss if the existing fishing capacity could be restructured to provide more employment. It only
states that subcontracting under fair conditions could be considered to benefit both the “big” and
the “small” The competitive process envisaged for transferring the Total Allowable Catch rights
could perhaps frustrate the original objective of fair and equitable distribution of rights. It will prevent
economically vulnerable groups from getting a foothold in the industry and could hinder the
redistribution of income and opportunities to the poor. This process will only benefit the rich blacks.
Further, the suggestion to reduce the number of fishers will only affect the disadvantaged blacks
and coloureds. The White Paper also makes the fundamental mistake of confusing fishers with
fishing capacities. Fishing capacity can be reduced without displacing labour if technology is
judiciously selected. What is needed is a phased redistribution of fishing capacities through an
appropriate combination of capital and labour in the choice of fishing technologies, along with the
“unbundling’ of access rights to benefit the black community.
In addition to quota, catch and effort, granting territorial use rights in fisheries should also be
considered, especially in the case of species like rock lobster and abalone. Such rights could be
given exclusively to the artisanal fishers (or subsistence fishers, as they are called in the White
Paper), who depend on the coastal resources for their livelihood. Given their relatively smaller
number, it should be possible to grant such permanent rights to legitimate claimants to the coastal
resources. Granting them long-term rights, subject to better conservation and management
measures, could go a long way in improving living standards as well as the law and order situation
in the coastal areas.
In any case, from the point of view of restructuring access regimes, there is no guarantee that the
blacks will be automatically empowered, even if the so-called real long-term rights are transferred
to them. Given the scope for a lease market for such rights, control can still be exercised by the
whites in different forms, thus defeating the original purpose of restructuring fishing rights. What is
urgently required is a system that can not be misused, in devious new forms, to perpetrate the
existing inequitable power relations in fisheries. The system should be more responsive to the
structural dimensions of black poverty and the lack of economic opportunities for blacks. 
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Fisheries policy
Straddling the colour barrier
Policymakers in post-apartheid South Africa have 
the unenviable task of resolving conflicting interests in fisheries
The government of South Africa, led by
Nelson Mandela, is currently considering
a major restructuring of its fisheries policy
to ensure greater participation of the
non-white communities in the marine
capture fisheries. A White Paper on the
fisheries policy of the post-apartheid
government has just been prepared.
To understand this process in the
backdrop of major issues in marine
fisheries, to follow-up on ICSF contacts and
to co-operate with fishworker initiatives
in South Africa, I visited several important
fishing centres in Western Cape and
Eastern Cape, the provinces that account
for almost the entire marine fish
production of South Africa. The trip
provided opportunities to meet with
established trade unions in fisheries; local,
regional and national associations of
fishers that are not affiliated to unions;
managers of big business groups, and
lawyers. There were also meetings with
the Fisheries Desk of the African National
Congress (ANC), parliamentarians,
policymakers and members of the
judiciary and press.
With a seaboard of 3,000 kin, South Africa
produces about 580,000 tonnes of fish in
liveweight (valued at US$400 million).
Fisheries contribute to nearly half a per
cent of the Gross Domestic Product. The
access to resources is distributed mainly
through a combination of quotas (for fish
such as hake, abalone, rock lobsters,
anchovies and pilchard) and permits (for
tuna and squid). The sector employs about
30,000 fishworkers (around 20,000 fishers
and about 10,000 processing workers).
The Directorate of Sea Fisheries, the
department responsible for fisheries
matters, has been shunted from ministry
to ministry. Originally under the Ministry
of Economic Affairs, it was later shifted to
the Ministries of Industries and
Agriculture. Since 1983, it has been under
the Ministry of Environmental Affairs.
Until 1990, access rights and fishing
licences were given by the Directorate of
Sea Fisheries. The Quota Board was
formed in 1990 and, since then, it has been
awarding quotas on the advice of the Sea
Fisheries Advisory Committee. The
allocation of non-quota species is still
made by the Department of Sea Fisheries.
There are 25 deep-sea hake quota holders,
of which 13 are for trawling. The biggest
eleven belong to the South Africa
Deep-sea Trawling Association. They
caught about 165,000 tonnes of fish in
1995. Three companies control over 78 per
cent of the deep-sea hake quotas of South
Africa. There are about 56 vessels with a
combined tonnage of 43,500 GRT valued at
US$80 million, which is the largest
investment in the fisheries of South Africa.
About 80 per cent of fresh and frozen fish
consumed in South Africa comes from this
sector, which reports annual sales worth
US$160 million, including about US$50
million from exports. It is the largest
foreign exchange earner in fisheries.
(Some of the world’s finest hake products
come from South Africa and a substantial
proportion consists of products with a
high local value added component.)
Code of conduct
Around 2,000 fishers are employed in the
deep-sea sector and another 6,000 in
permanent or non-seasonal work. The
workers in this sector subscribe to a code
of conduct. In addition to remuneration,
they are entitled to fishing commissions,
bonuses and company contributions to
employee benefit schemes. In the
inshore—defined as waters below 110 in
depth contour—there were 11 quota
holders in 1995. They belong to the
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Southeast Coast Fishing Association and
function in multi-species fisheries. They
also hold quotas for hake and aguilhas
sole, and catch about 15,000 tonnes.
The inshore trawling sector usesvessels 14 m to 32 m in length.There are now about 34 vessels in
operation (down from 54 in 1982). The
sector provides employment for 300
fishers and 800 land-based workers. The
workers are entitled to pension,
provident fund, housing assistance and
freedom of association, and they are
affiliated to several unions. The majority
of workers come from the South East
Cape region.
The quota system for pelagic stocks was
introduced in South Africa in 1974. The
quotas were given to factories and not to
private boatowners. Large companies
control the pelagic fishery, from
production to retail trade. More than half
the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for
pelagics is apparently controlled by six
companies (the TAC for pilchard is 23,000
tonnes and for anchovies, 256,000
tonnes). Tuna is also harvested, with a
TAC of about 3,000 tonnes.
There are about 73 purse-seiners in South
Africa. Apart from a small proportion of
pilchard canned for human
consumption, and some used as bait,
most of the landings are processed into
fish oil (sold to the food products
industry) and fishmeal (sold locally to
poultry farms). The pelagic fisheries
generate employment for over 1,000
workers at sea and about 4,000 workers on
land. The tuna industry employs about
2,600 fishers.
Jigging for squid (called ‘white gold’), the
most recent fishing industry in South
Africa, began in 1986. It is based on
permits issued on the basis of annual
performance. There are about 278 vessels,
of which 112 are between 10-20 m and 19
between 20-30 m in length. The fishery is
worth US$15 million. It employs about
4,000 people at sea and 1,000 ashore.
Line-fishing comprises several sectors,
ranging from full-time commercial
operators to recreational fishers. While it
provides seasonal and occasional
employment to about 19,000 fishers, it is
also a source of recreation for hundreds
and is the key support to marine-related
tourism. The species fished include snoek,
kob, yellowtail, hottentot and carpenter.
The commercial operators sell these fish to
hawkers on the quay. There are about
2,364 hand-line boats. Of these, about
1,000 are less than 6 m and four are over
50 m in length.
Abalone fishery
The abalone fishery is a shallow-water
one, where TAC quotas have been issued
to six companies for 615 tonnes. There is
also an extensive recreational fishery
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associated with abalone. It employs 58
boats and about 200 fishers. Rock lobsters
are found at depths less than 80 m isobath.
Traps and hoop nets are used in this
fishery, which has a TAC for 2,000 tonnes.
There is also a South Coast rock lobster
harvested at depths of 100 m to 200 m
isobath.
This fishery has a TAC of 452 tonnes.In the peak season, it employs 218boats of lengths ranging from 6-40
m, and around 5,000 fishers. Most of the
informal fishermen of South Africa (about
5,000) make a living by illegally catching
rock lobster.
Fishermen’s Community Trusts (FCTs)
were established in 1992 to uplift and
develop the fishing communities along
the west coast. A certain proportion of the
deep-sea hake TAC was set aside for
allocation to FCTs. In 1995, about five per
cent of the hake TAC and four per cent of
the anchovies TAC were set aside for FCTs.
Since the harvesting of hake requires
highly technical and expensive
equipment which the FCTs do not have
and can ill afford, they are unable to
participate in the harvesting, processing
and marketing of quotas. Their quotas are,
therefore, sold to established fishing
companies.
An 1830 painting, Fishmongers, by HC de
Meillon in the Cape Town Museum shows
vendors carrying fish on wooden poles
across their shoulders, as can be seen in
Southeast Asia. This suggests a local food
fishery in South Africa in the 19th century,
perhaps with the participation of the
original slaves from Indonesia.
Commercialization of the South African
fishing industry, however, was initiated at
the turn of the century by Messrs Irvin and
Johnson, two British nationals, who set up
a vertically integrated firm for the export
of deep-sea hake.
Unlike in the rest of Africa, Asia or Latin
America, South Africa has the rare
distinction of having developed an
industrial fishery much before the growth
of an artisanal or small-scale fishery.
Almost the entire catch comes from
industrial trawling and purse-seining.
Mainly controlled by white companies,
these have a highly skewed ownership
pattern. For instance, in hake, the most
important fisheries in South Africa, three
white companies controlled 72 per cent of
the TAC in 1996. Irvin & Johnson Ltd., set
up by the pioneers, continues to be one of
those three companies.
There are about eight large firms that
control the fisheries of South Africa. These
also have business interests in food
products like potato chips, canned
tomatoes and olives. Some of them are
also involved in diamond and gold
mining. These companies are essentially
subsidiaries of big South African
multinationals and are controlled by a
handful of families.
The non-white groups participated in the
coastal fishery in a rudimentary capacity
for the local market, in addition to
working on board white-owned fishing
vessels and processing plants. A
small-scale fishery, very limited in scope
and mainly for the local market, thus
co-existed with an industrial fishery for
the export market.
This situation changed to some extent in
the 1970s, when a quota system was
introduced in South African fisheries. The
access enjoyed by the non-whites to
lobster fisheries was then suddenly taken
away by the apartheid regime and given
to the white companies. This forced many
people from the coastal communities to
fish illegally for rock lobster and supply
clandestinely to the black market at
cheaper prices. The right to fish non-quota
species like snoek, however, is still open to
all, both non-whites and whites.
With the demise of apartheid, there have
been new entrants into the
quota-managed fishing industry from the
coloured, black and Indian communities.
In 1995, for example, about five per cent of
the TAC for hake and four per cent for
anchovies were set aside for the non-white
communities. The quotas were
insufficient to undertake viable
investments and were nick-named ‘paper
quotas’ since, in most instances, they were
sold to the white companies.
New fisheries policy
Unlike the Sea Fishery Act of 1988 that
focused on conservation of the marine
ecosystem and orderly utilization of living
marine resources, the new fisheries policy
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of post-apartheid South Africa advocates
the utilization of such marine resources is
undertaken on a long-term, sustainable
basis, with optimum social and economic
benefits to the people. There is a great
deal of discussion and debate on what
ought to be the new policy in relation to
equity.
While the big companies and richlabour unions of non-whitesare unanimously for the
continuation of the existing system,
coloureds, blacks and Indians are divided
on what ought to be the focus of the new
policy. These groups are essentially three:
the Informal Fishing Community, an
association of fishers from the
unorganized artisanal sector, that makes
a living by illegally fishing for rock
lobster and abalone in the nearshore
waters; the Food and Allied Workers
Union (FAWU), the biggest union of food
workers which also represents industrial
fishworkers, including women; and
the cluster that includes interest groups
like the Fisheries Development Unit, the
Port Elizabeth Fishing Forum and several
other regional and local associations of
coastal communities encompassing a
variety of interests, ranging from wage
workers to quota and licence holders.
The various perspectives on allocation of
fisheries resources in the post-apartheid
era can be classified into four categories.
This classification, however, does not
imply that there is no overlap between
these categories.
In what can be labelled the ‘restructuralist’
school, there is first the FAWU that
demands restructuring of all sectors of
fisheries, including production,
processing and marketing for all
commercially valuable fish, from a holistic
perspective, through a transparent and
participatory process.
It wants this to be done without losing
existing employment opportunities and
also by taking into consideration the
Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP) of the Republic of South
Africa. It also wants to ‘address the
wrongs of the past’, which include the
discriminatory practices of the apartheid
regime, such as the exclusion of informal
fishers from fishing activities.
Black elites
This group is against redistribution of
quotas by the Quota Board to the ‘black
elites’, fearing that such acts will only
exacerbate the problem of restructuring
the industry. Also, it thinks that giving
unviable quotas would only result in the
new quota holders selling tern to big
companies. It regards the Quota Board’s
distribution of quotas to non-whites as a
rent a black’ policy and considers it an
initiative that misses the wood for the
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trees. FAWU also insists that attempts at
restructuring should also apply to the
‘newcomers’, meaning non-white quota
holders.
Mandla Gxanyana, GeneralSecretary of FAWU andfacilitator of the Fisheries Policy
Development Committee (FDPC)
constituted by Dr. Dawie de Villiers,
Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism, in late 1994, for developing a
new fisheries policy for South Africa, feels
that both processing workers and fishers
should benefit from restructuring. He
wants the problems of fishing
communities (including both harvesters
and processors) to be addressed.
He thinks a non-quota system that will
empower the harvesting workers without
affecting the chain of workers in
processing and marketing may be
desirable. He does not want people
without any history in fisheries to get
quotas. He thinks area-based and national
associations should have a larger stake in
capture fisheries. He would prefer some
demarcation of fishing grounds: those
earmarked for deep-sea fisheries and
those set aside for bona fide fishermen
from the coastal communities.
The interests of those who are
marginalized, the bona fide fishermen,
have to be looked after. The policy should
be to enrich neither a few blacks nor a few
whites. The current way of reforming
fisheries, unfortunately, does not address
the basic problem, says Gxanyana.
The ‘abolitionist’ school is made up of
non-white groups, mainly the Informal
Fishing Community, who are fighting to
abolish the existing system of quota
allocation. Their main concern is
unconditional access to coastal fisheries
for rock lobster and abalone. They fear
that any redistribution of the TAC, short of
levelling the playing field and abolishing
the current access regimes, would not do
justice to their concerns. The demands of
the Informal Fishing Community are also
supported by FAWU.
In its Submission to the FDPC on Access
Rights, the Informal Fishing Community
argues basically for a laissez-faire approach
to fisheries, except in the case of abalone.
It believes in the fairness of the market
system and does not want any
government intervention in fisheries,
except for conservation and monitoring of
catch (to make sure that landings do not
exceed the TAC). It considers current
estimates as politically motivated and
would like objective assessments of stocks
that could act as the basis for deciding the
TAC. It believes that access to fisheries
resources should be governed only
through a fee based on the size of the
fishing vessel, in the context of abalone
fishery, however, it proposes greater
control and something like a territorial use
rights regime.
The third group is the ‘redistributionist’
school comprising other non-white
groups who demand greater
redistribution to non-white fishing
communities of the quotas enjoyed by
white companies. They are interested in
viable quotas (meaning quotas that would
enable them to economically invest in
fishing capacity) for important fisheries
like hake, anchovies, abalone and rock
lobster. This group seems to be mainly
represented by the Fisheries Development
Unit in the Western Cape and Port
Elizabeth Fishing Forum in the Eastern
Cape region.
There is also another perspective within
this group, especially among some in the
Eastern Cape, who feel that non-white
quota holders should share their quotas
with poor fishers from the same
communities. They see the attitude of the
majority of new quota holders, who refuse
to share the newly acquired quotas with
their poor non-white neighbours, as
similar to the behaviour of white
companies under the apartheid regime.
The mosaic of new claimants to fishery
resources from within the non-white
fishing communities include:
• fishermen with quotas but who
have no fishing capacity;
• fishermen who have both quotas
and fishing capacity;
• fishermen from the informal
sector, not legally recognized as
fishermen;
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• retired fishermen from fishing
companies;
• fishermen made redundant by
fishing companies;
• widows of fishermen; and
• women processing workers.
In addition, there are several interest
groups outside the fisheries sector which
would like to partake of the quota system.
According to the redistributionists,
putting an end to the quota system, as
demanded by the abolitionists and
restructuralists, would only lead to
open-access regimes and depletion of
commercially valuable fish stocks The
Fisheries Development Unit thinks that
controlling access through a quota
system is a necessary prerequisite to
ensure the sustainability of the resource.
While wanting to retain the quota system,
they are for the abolition of the Quota
Board, which is seen as a relic of the
apartheid past. In its place, they want a
Namibian system of quota management,
where the bulk of the quotas are believed
to have been given to non-whites.
In a memorandum dated 14 May 1996 to
the Minister Designate, Pallo Jordan, the
Informal Fishing Community contends
that allowing access to those currently
excluded from fisheries will ultimately
benefit only the big companies. This is
because no attempt is made to redress the
fundamental imbalance arising from the
concentration of harvesting and
processing capacity in the hands of a few.
Given the technical capability of the
white companies, and the lack of it among
non-white communities, any situation of
open access may understandably benefit
the old players more than new entrants.
Finally, in the status quo school are those
companies which wish to maintain the
status quo. They are supported mostly by
unionized fishermen, including
coloureds and blacks, who fear that any
restructuring would negatively affect
their current earnings from fishing
operations like trawling and long-lining.
They are called ‘sweetheart unions’, a
derogatory term for unions that are close
to big business. The main difference
between FAWU and these unions is that
whereas FAWU tries to take on board the
interests of unorganized fishers, the latter
support only their own self-interest.
The redistributionists have dismissed the
new Marine Fisheries Policy of South
Africa as a status quo policy since it does
not propose to change the highly skewed
ownership pattern in fisheries and since it
makes no mention of redistributing
quotas currently enjoyed by the white
companies to non-whites.
There is thus a divide between the
non-whites in the organized sector who
support the status quo and the non-whites
who demand change. There are further
differences among those who demand a
change, often based on altered
perspectives. These affect the unity of the
non-whites and also add new
complications to the present situation.
Not convinced
Some of the labour, especially those who
do not have any complaints against the
existing conditions of work and
remuneration in the industrial fisheries,
are yet to feel convinced that their rights
will be protected and their earnings
maintained if there is a radical change in
the system. In one instance, on 13 May
1996, there was a physical clash between
two sections in Cape Town, with one side
shouting, “You want to take our jobs
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away!”, and the other shouting back, “You
are pawns of the big companies!”
The apprehensions of the organizedlabour force are also perhaps basedon the fact that very few of the
non-white claimants to the quotas have
their own capacity to fish. They are also
yet to learn the ropes of fish processing
and marketing.
Also adding to the confusion is the
minority of migrant blacks from tribal
homelands who work as wage labourers
in the seasonal squid fishery of Eastern
Cape. They are perhaps the poorest and
are far removed from the debate on
fisheries restructuring or redistribution of
quotas. Their main demand is for greater
diversification of fishing operations and
for round-the-year employment.
The positions of the Informal Fishing
Community and that of FAWU seem to
converge at several points. Both seem to
be against the quota system and share the
concern that the redistributed quotas are
basically falling into the wrong hands.
They also seem to agree upon a
demarcation of fishing grounds between
coastal and deep-sea fisheries. Both
demand that only bona fide fishers among
the new claimants should be allowed to
participate in fisheries.
The inference that could perhaps be
drawn is that activities not
labour-intensive at the stage of harvesting
or processing (like harvesting and
processing of abalone and rock lobster)
could be reallocated to bona fide fishers in
the informal sector. Other activities which
are more labour-intensive should, by and
large, remain as they are.
In other words, the message seems to be
that the biggest union of fishers and
processing workers, while willing to
uphold the livelihood rights of non-white
coastal communities who are dependent
on fisheries, is not keen to support the
business aspirations of the non-whites,
except those of the workers themselves.
The reluctance of formal unions to
support the redistributionists might arise
from the present position of organized
labour in South Africa. The condition of
work and remuneration of South African
fishworkers is fairly good in big
companies. These workers might fear that
hard-earned benefits would get
dissipated in any transition from the
known present to an unknown future.
Clearly, there is need to have a set of
criteria for allocation of resources and an
enabling legislation to implement it.
While it is easy to identify the distinct
capital and labour interests among those
who favour the status quo, it is, however,
too early to differentiate the interests of
those who favour change.
It is also too early to say who among the
non-white communities will largely
benefit if the government changes the
norms for quota allocation. The ‘haves’ on
both sides of the colour barrier seem to be
mobilizing the numerous ‘have-nots’ to
fight for their respective interests. There is,
however, tremendous distrust and
questioning of motives.
Difficult situation
In such a difficult situation, the
policymakers’ role is rather unenviably
delicate. There has to be greater clarity on
who among the interested parties could
best serve the goals of long-term
sustainable utilization of marine
resources and livelihood interests of
coastal communities.
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Marine Stewardship Council 
Who’s being seduced?
As the Marine Stewardship Council tries to sell itself in 
the South, critics are starting to question its market orientation
The Marine Stewardship Council(MSC) is trying to tackle an issue ofglobal concern: the sustainable use
of fishery resources for the benefit of
current and future generations. As part of
the process of setting up the MSC,
‘Principles and Criteria’ are being
established and developed for
sustainable fishing. These will eventually
provide the logic for a certifying scheme
that will be used to qualify (or disqualify)
fisheries products for the MSC ecolabel.
This aspect of the MSC has the potential to
make a valuable contribution to the
whole sustainability debate, and is to be
welcomed.
The process of consultation being
undertaken by the MSC project in devising
and developing its Principles and Criteria
is being conducted in an extremely open
and transparent manner. The project is
seeking to consult with, and be guided by,
the views of as many stakeholders in the
fisheries sector as possible. This is also a
very positive aspect of the project and is
proving to be highly successful in
stimulating debate.
However, of considerable concern to
many people is that the MSC is based on a
Northern-driven neoliberal agenda.
According to Carl-Christian Schmidt the
recently appointed Project Manager of
the MSC, “Ecolabelling is a neoliberal tool
and the MSC is going down that path.”
From a neoliberal market perspective,
livelihoods and cultural traditions are no
different from consumer durables like
cars, and, as such, can be valued and
traded. In the neoliberal marketplace,
selling your fish quota (and your
livelihood from fishing). is no different
from selling your car.
Yet, it is likely that it will be the trading
interests, like supermarket chains and
retail outlets, which will support the MSC,
and determine whether or not fish with
MSC ecolabels become popular consumer
items. In the UK, supermarkets account
for around 60 per cent of fresh fish and 80
per cent of frozen fish sales. These stores,
conscious of their public image and their
market shares, will be the ones to welcome
the MSC ecolabelling scheme, not
consumers themselves.
The MSC’s interest in the South would
seem to be mainly as a source of fish
products which could be accredited. Fish
sporting the MSC label will only be
marketed in the North. It is unlikely that
they will be sold in the South.
On S May, Schmidt, Julia Novy, the
consultant recently appointed to help the
MSC devise its strategy for the South, and
several key people from WWF and
Unilever hosted a ‘Less Developed
Countries Workshop’ in London. The
agenda included three key questions:
Who are the relevant stakeholders? What
are the key issues facing the introduction
of the MSC in developing countries? What
should be the strategy and action plan for
the MSC in developing countries?
Of the 12 participants, six were WWF,
Unilever and MSC staffers. Except for a
participant from Papua New Guinea, the
rest were from a variety of UK NGOs and
consultancy firms with interests in the
South. Laura Cooper of the WWF’S
Endangered Seas Campaign explained
that, as far as the South is concerned, the
application of the MSC to developing
countries was being put off until after the
core programme was established.
Lots of questions
“We know we don’t know how to do it
right (in the South), we know we need to
ask a lot of questions”, she said, adding
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that the workshop and subsequent
consultations were designed “to put them
in touch with the people who they need to
be in touch with.”
Schmidt clarified that the MSC wouldbe limited to taking a “slice of thefisheries sector.” The MSC might set
right some, but not all, wrongs. “We are
living in a second-best world and have to
apply second-best solutions,” he said.
MSC accreditation will require participants
to buy into the certification scheme by
paying for accreditation and subsequent
monitoring. Smaller fleets of large ships
able to offer bulk supplies will have an
advantage over larger fleets of small
vessels whose supplies may fluctuate.
Small-scale, decentralized,
community-based fisheries, prevalent in
the South, might be discriminated against,
because they would not be able to buy into
the MSC certification scheme. It could also
prove too costly for MSC certifying agents
to accredit the many small-scale,
decentralized fisheries. The MSC may thus
favour more centralized,
company-owned fishing operations.
As the process of developing the MSC
Principles and Criteria advances,
boundaries will need to be drawn around
what the MSC includes and what it
excludes. This may mean that
environmental and technical factors will
be the main determining criteria for
accreditation, while social factors may be
pushed into the background.
Although the MSC deals with
inter-generational, not allocation, issues,
fisheries where allocation issues are
resolved through privatization (for
example, through management systems
based on individual transferable quotas)
will be easier to certify. It will also be
easier for the MSC to certify fisheries on
scientific evidence, than on more socially
based traditional knowledge systems.
In the fisheries of developing countries,
traditional community-based resource
allocation systems and socially based
management systems are widespread but
not widely recognized or acknowledged.
With its scientific and technical bias, will
the MSC discriminate against these?
The question of exporting a Northern
agenda to the South is also a major issue
for many people, who see the MSC as
Northern neocolonialism in another
guise. There are many in the South who do
not share the North-devised neoliberal
agenda on which the MSC is based, and
who would, therefore oppose its
imposition. There are also many who feel
that the North should rather be
questioning and regulating its own
patterns of consumption, rather than let
consumerism drive its citizens’ lives.
More work left
Clearly, there is a lot of work to be done
before the MSC will be fully up and
running. According to Schmidt, it should
be completely independent and
functional by end 1998. Given this tight
deadline and its inherent partiality, how
serious can the MSC initiative be as a tool
to encourage long-term sustainability, as
opposed to being just another short-term
marketing gimmick?
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Marine Stewardship Council
Don’t be harsh on the MSC
Both fishing communities and consumers have 
much to gain from the recent MSC initiative, says a former fisher
As a former fisher, I disagree withthe conclusion drawn by BarbaraNeis in her article “Cut Adrift”
(SAMUDRA, November 1996), which
analyzes the potential impacts of the
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)
initiative. Although Neis points out many
of the possible benefits of the MSC, she
concludes that this initiative, designed to
harness market forces to promote
sustainable fishing, disenfranchises
women and is “the equivalent of a death
sentence for (sic) fisheries and
communities that depend upon them.’
The basic fallacy in Neis’s prediction of
the MSC’s impacts is the assumption that
fisheries are static and that any
programme designed to have an impact
on fisheries must address all current
inequities associated with fisheries. The
state of fisheries worldwide is not static.
Global fish catches have increased 500 per
cent in the last 40 years. Fishing
communities, such as those on the
Atlantic coast of Canada and America,
are already in jeopardy or have collapsed,
as have some fish stocks. The social costs
of mismanagement are severe;
overfishing ruins communities and
wrecks the lives of women, men and
children.
Fisheries are complex and
multi-dimensional, encompassing
biological, environmental, social and
economic factors, and scientific
uncertainty. The MSC, in developing
criteria to evaluate the sustainability of
fisheries, is taking these factors into
account. The mission of the MSC is to work
for sustainable marine fisheries by
promoting responsible, environmentally
appropriate, socially beneficial and
economically viable fishing practices.
However, the MSC is not a panacea for our
worldwide fisheries crisis. It is designed
to provide consumers with a more direct
way of promoting sustainability in
fisheries through market forces, so that
women, men and children may rely on
healthy supplies of fish in the future. It is
not designed to replace existing
democratic institutions, which should be
encouraged to promote sustainability,
and, for that matter, social equality.
As an individual who has fished for a
living, I am intimately aware of the
shortcomings of modern fisheries
management and applaud a programme
designed to promote sustainable fishing
practices for the benefit of the resource
and those who depend upon it.
Consumer point of view
As a consumer, I support a mechanism
allowing consumers to have a more direct
impact on fisheries management through
the market place. I encourage all of those
in fishing communities, women and men
alike, who have so much to lose from
overfishing and mismanagement, and so
much to gain from conservation and
sustainability, to support the Marine
Stewardship Council.
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This response to the debate on the
MSC Initiative carried by SAMUDRA
comes from Laura Cooper, an
ex-fisher from Alaska, US, who is now
the International Programme
Officer of WWF’s Endangered Seas
Campaign.
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Fisheries management
Are ITQs really a panacea?
Controlling who fishes what, where, when and how might 
be culturally and ecologically more sensible than quota allocations
“Natural resources must be developed and
preserved for the benefit of the many and not
merely for the profit of a few.”
—The Fight for Conservation by Gifford Pinchot
Someone should carve GiffordPinchot’s words of 1910 in stoneand place them outside DG XIV (the
Fisheries Commission of the European
Union, EU) in Brussels and at the door of
the European Parliament.
While Pinchot was writing specifically
about the US. Forest Service at the
beginning of this century, his words could
be justifiably applied to the world’s
marine fisheries today.
In 2002, there will be a review of the
Common Fisheries Policy of the EU. The
extent of this review and its legal standing
is currently being much debated. Some
believe that all aspects are up for
re-consideration, while others think that
irrevocable decisions were stitched into
the Treaty of Corfufor instance, the
introduction of Community Fishing
Permits after 2002. The most that can be
hoped for are decisions on the Shetland
Box and the 12-mile limit to free access.
It is doubtful whether the Eli intends to
radically change its management systems.
Rather, the indications are that it merely
intends to ‘fine-tune’ current systems of
quota allocations by the introduction of a
market mechanism. This article advocates
a rethink on such a strategy.
Aided by cliches that abound in the mass
media, we, in Europe, appear to be in great
danger of being swept along by an
uncritical tide of belief that the salvation
of fish stocks rests in allocating individual
fishers, tradable quotas or Individual
Transferable Quotas (ITQs).
When Garret Hardin, a genetic biologist,
wrote a paper on birth control and titled it
The Tragedy of the Commons, academics
subsequently overlooked its potential
contribution to fisheries management,
that is, Hardin’s recognition of human
problems as not calling for mere technical
solutions, and his analysis of how to
ensure that people curb their perceived
freedom in order that the greater number
might be freer.
The mass media, instead, was caught up
in the catchy title of Hardin’s paper,
though its analysis had been clearly and
fully explained 14 years earlier by Scott
Gordon in The Economic Theory 4 a Common
Property Resource: the Fishery. It is difficult
to ascertain whether it was the mass
media’s frequent use of the phrase which
dulled the academics’ critical capacities to
better evaluate Hardin’s paper or whether
the overused title offered administrators
and politicians alike an understanding of
not only the problem but also a solution,
an understanding which enabled and
encouraged them to more readily engage
with the academics.
Once the problem and solution could be
understood in simple terms, resources in
the form of research funds were more
willingly directed at addressing the
fisheries conundrum.
Interpretation challenged
In more recent times, an increasing
number of people are challenging
Hardin’s interpretation of the commons as
applied to fisheries, i.e. the belief that
common property resources are by nature
open-access and will inevitably lead to
tragedy. Indeed, there are those who
believe that very few, if any, truly
open-access fisheries exist in the world. It
is argued that most societies have their
own, often unspoken, rules which very
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clearly dictate who can fish what, where,
when and how.
As J. Cordell says in A Sea of SmallBoats, “There aren’t many placeswhere an outsider can just walk
into town and start fishing, hauling nets,
setting traps and so on. Anyone doubting
the validity of this principle has only to
try it out.”
However, the move to more centralized
management systems, coupled with
technological advances have, in certain
instances, broken down implicit control
systems and, in themselves, have
contributed to the creation of greater
open-access fisheries.
In uncritically swimming along with the
‘Tragedy of the Commons’ tide, subtle
community regimes and controls were
ignored. They were not even recognized
or understood and were replaced by
centralized controls which had little
understanding of ‘what’ (fishing) and
‘who’ (fishers) they were attempting to
control. This lack of understanding meant
that regulations imposed from above
were perceived in the fishing
communities as having little or no
legitimacy and, accordingly, required
complex and expensive enforcement
arrangements which were of
questionable efficiency and effectiveness.
The uncritical acceptance of trite cliches
should make us much more wary.
Alarmingly, though, a wave similar to the
‘Tragedy of the Commons’ type appears
to be gaining strength around the
world—that ITQs are the salvation of the
fish stocks because they will:
• generate a more economically
efficient fishing industry;
• rationalize production without
intervention from public funds;
• create the conditions for
sustainable commercial fisheries;
• ensure a more easily manageable
sector; and
• result in lower enforcement costs.
Currently, there are too few academic
voices being publicly raised against ITQs.
The analysis of the problem and. its
solution seem foolproof, which is the only
way it will appear if one is desk-bound
and views the sector in a career time span,
as opposed to the everyday
catch-to-market reality of the fishing
community.
There are fishery managers who view ITQ
as a means of engineering changes which
will make fisheries easier to manage and
at minimum cost to public funds; a fishery
with fewer ownership units and
geographically more centralized in larger
ports. These developments greatly
simplify the task of administrators. Such
simple solutions, however, pay little heed
to the ultimate shape of a fishing industry
so fashioned and the resultant effects on
stock and people.
It is also very difficult for biological
scientists, who have been prevalent in
fisheries management for long, to concede
that their science is too imprecise to enable
a numerical approach, such as quotas, to
be successful. A dangerous assumption
underlying ITQs is that TACs (total
allowable catches) are proven
mechanisms and that ITQs attempt the
fine-tuning of a basically sound concept.
It is possible that the numerical systems’
objective is not conservation, as claimed,
but rather, to serve multinational firms
which need to work in certainties to
provide for the increasingly lucrative
international market in quality fish
products. Quotas and ITQs create a certain,
predictable environment in which firms
can plan their purchasing, pricing and
product development.
Traditional techniques
In the past 25 years there has been
increasing interest in traditional fishing
management techniques and much has
been written about TURF (Territorial Use
Rights in Fisheries) and CMT (Customary
Marine Tenure) systems. More recently,
attention has focused on community
management and co-management
regimes, prompted by the perceived
failures of modem fisheries management
systems. These represent attempts at
understanding, more fully, the nature of
the fisheries and how, in the past, users
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and use of the resource have been
managed.
Some people ask: why spend somuch energy on stipulating whatnumerically should or may be
extracted when we will never know, with
any degree of certainty, what is there in
the first place? Not just what is there, but
also what processes other than fishing are
taking their share of the catch. If these facts
can not be ascertained with any degree of
certainty, why are we encouraging a
supposedly precise system to tackle a very
imprecise, complex and possibly chaotic
situation?
Such questions suggest that there are
possible lessons to be learnt from past
fisher communities who concentrated
their efforts on maintaining an
equilibrium in the marine environment
rather than on the numbers to be
extracted. It is possible that controlling
who fishes what, where, when and how
might prove to be more culturally and
ecologically sound. A recent draft report
on the Common Fisheries Policy after
2002, by the Fisheries Committee of the
European Parliament, calls for member
state TACs to be assigned to individual
fishermen and for measures to “guarantee
the proper operation of the market in
fishing rights.” The apparent purpose of
this proposal (a Motion for a Resolution)
is to break away from the system of
national quotas which is perceived as
running counter to the introduction of a
single market in the fisheries sector. Its
intention is to allocate quotas to
individual fishermen and to then
encourage trade in quotas, thus leaving
the market to dictate the restructuring of
the fishing fleet. This shows just how
strongly the tide of belief in TACs and ITQs
has swept over us.
A 1996 paper by E. Ethorsson on the
impact of ITQs in Iceland, Coastal
Communities and fl~ Management: the Case
of Icelandic Fisheries, should serve as a
warning on the implications of this
numerical system of fisheries
management. In particular, the creation of
a trade in the system needs to be much
more thoroughly and openly debated,
before the EU’S Parliament gives its
approval to the Motion for a Resolution.
Recent Icelandic experience reveals that
from 1984, when ITQs were introduced,
until the end of 1993, the fleet has actually
increased by nine per cent gross registered
tonnage (GRT) and by 17 per cent
horsepower. Trawlers over 500 GRT have
doubled in aggregate tonnage and small
coastal vessels have increased by 57 per
cent in tonnage.
Increased share
The large companies, which held 25.5 per
cent of ITQs in 1991, increased their share
to 47.2 per cent by 1994. There has been a
very clear geographical centralization of
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the industry and a marginalization of the
small fishing communities. 
According to the study, “Alongwith a loss of local control overunits of production and a decline
of the land-based processing industry,
people in these communities are losing
their future rights to harvest the fish
resources. The fishermen-owned inshore
fleet with owned quota is shrinking and,
due to quota shortage, many inshore
vessels are now dependent on quota
leasing arrangements with the larger
companies.”
In effect, the landowner becomes a tenant.
The fisherman who yesterday sold his
large vessel to an expanding company
now has to lease quota from the company
in order to operate his small inshore
vessel. Ethorsson foresees the present
trend resulting in the majority of
Icelandic ITQs being owned by
multinational companies and ponders
what the national benefit from such
efficiency might be.
In Reply: Chaos and Parametric
Management, J. A. Wilson, James Acheson
and Peter Kleban recently asked the
following questions:
• Should rules restraining fishing be
designed to emphasize the
maintenance of a balance between
harvesting and spawning or
should they emphasize the
maintenance of system structure?
• Should our scientific agenda
emphasize population
assessments, as is presently done,
or should it emphasize the
investigation and monitoring of
ecosystem structure and state?
• Should the governance of fisheries
continue to emphasize top-down
centralized control or is there a
need to decentralize and
democratize the process?
Merits and demerits
In the context of EU and many other
fisheries, greater debate is urgently
required on the merits and demerits of the
current numerical system of fisheries
management—whom does it well serve,
and whom does it ill serve? Such a debate
is required before, rather than after, any
further fine-tuning. Perhaps Pinchot’s
words of 1910 might be the best guide for
such a debate.
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fisheries researcher and
campaigner, based in Ireland
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Conservation
The roar of the sea lion
When nature conservation efforts grow irrational, the results 
can be disastrous, as shown by the case of the sea lions off Peru
According to FAO, there are 116species of marine mammals in theworld. Of these, 60 are found in
the South East Pacific (Ecuador, Chile,
Peru). It is commonly recognized here that
the pinnipeda compete with fish for
resources. The pinnipeda in Peru
comprise the southern fur seal
(Arctocephalus australis) and the southern
sea lion (Otaria byronia). The latter,
because of their great numbers, pose a
huge problem for the artisanal fisheries.
In Peru, this is a particularly significant
problem and, since 1970, when the
Ministry of Fisheries was created, it has
received greater government attention.
Yet, 27 years after the creation of the
Ministry, only three multisectoral official
commissions have been constituted to
tackle the problems created for fishermen
by the sea lion.
Since 1991, Peru’s artisanal fishworkers
have been represented by the Federation
for the Integration and Unification of the
Artisanal Fishworkers of Peru (FIUPAP).
The Federation is very actively involved
in developing and promoting the artisanal
sector, It has a representative in the
seven-member official commission (with
the National Director of Artisanal Fishery
as chairman) constituted to determine
“actions to diminish the interference of the
southern sea lion in the artisanal fishery.”
According to the census by FIUPAP and
IMARPE (Instituto del Mar del Peru) in
1995-96, there are 6,258 artisanal fishing
vessels, of which 2,500 have an average
capacity of 2.5 gross registered tonnage
(GRT), using drift-nets to fish for species
like Peruvian silverside, eastern Pacific
bonito, lorna drum, cabinza grunt and
palm ruff. Peru’s artisanal sector includes
vessels up to 30 GRT.
The total population of Peru’s artisanal
fishworkers, including those in the coastal
and continental areas, is 45,000. Of this, 40
per cent fish without vessels,
A comparison of the figures for the
number of artisanal fishing craft and
southern sea lions justifies the call to
regulate the growth of the southern sea
lion population through a rational cull.
Year Artisanal Vessels Sea Lions
1971 4,700 30,054
1981 5,171 49,185
1990 5,960 103,562
1997 6,258 195,000
IMARPE recommended the harvest of 2,800
and 4,500 sea lions in 1984 and 1992
respectively, based on the principles of a
Plan of Global Action for Marine
Mammals developed between 1978 and
1983. During a meeting of experts in Costa
Rica in 1995, the Peruvian delegation,
represented by IMARPE, recommended
legislation for a programme to control the
population of southern sea lions and also
to curtail their interaction with the
fisheries through means that do not
negatively affect their population.
Environmental groups
However, these recommendations have
not been applied in Peru, mainly due to
pressures exerted by national
environmental groups which resist any
action to control the population of
southern sea lions. Worse, these groups do
not furnish alternative solutions for this
problem.
Granted that these days the
trade-environment nexus is an important
and controversial subject internationally.
Yet, in the application of unilateral
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measures under the pretext of
environmental protection, there seem to
be forces working against the commercial
interests of Peru. The access of its artisanal
fishery products to the markets of
developed countries would be affected.
The southern sea lion does not figurein international conservationagreements because its survival is
not in danger. On the other hand, the
negative economic impact on the incomes
of the fishworkers and communities of
Peru is not taken into account, nor is the
significant contribution of artisanal
fishery to global nutrition security.
A preliminary study by FIUPAP has
estimated the annual damage caused by
the southern sea lion to the artisanal fleet
at US$64 million. FIUPAP is now evaluating
the economic impact on other techniques
of fishing, so as to assess the larger
economic consequences.
Although Peru’s artisanal fishery receives
support from FONDEPES (National Fund
for Fisheries Development), there is very
little investment in credit programmes for
equipment, vessels or diversification of
the fishery. In 1995 and 1996, these
investments amounted to only US$3
million and US$6 million respectively.
Considering that fishing is the second
most important economic activity after
mining, the negative impact of the sea
lions on the incomes of Peruvian
fishermen is considerable. Artisanal
fishworkers are those principally
concerned with maintaining an adequate
ecological equilibrium in marine areas.
The survival of these communities
depends on the availability of marine
resources. While we recognize the rights
of marine mammals to live in the sea, we
must not forget to maintain some sort of
equilibrium.
In Peru, however, no such equilibrium is
sight. The situation appears set for a
struggle for survival, in which the greatest
damage would be precisely to the
environment. In such a scenario, the
blame should not be hurled at artisanal
fishworkers but at the mercenaries of the
conservation movement, who
misunderstand the relationship between
conservation and development. 
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This article written by Manuel Milla,
an artisanal fisherman from FIUPAP
(Federation de Integracion y
Unificion de los Pescadores
Artesanales del Peru), has bean
translated by Luz Pisua of Instituto
Huayuna, Lima, Peru
SAMUDRA JULY 1996 19
Faroese fishermen
Skilled fishers, bungling economy
The work of Foraya Fiskimannafelag, the association of Faroese 
fishermen, highlights the problems facing the Islands’ fisheries
The very first ships from the FaroeIslands sailed to fish in EastIceland Din 1872. That was when
the Faroese marine fishery began. By the
1930s, the fishery had evolved to such an
extent that most of the males in the Faroe
Islands were aboard ships in the waters
surrounding Iceland from spring to fall,
the season for marine fishing. The ships
were very primitive, for a very long time
not better equipped than Noah’s Arc.
They had hardly any safety equipment
and often capsized, losing all the hands
on board. The crew invariably came from
the same village as the skipper and there
were, therefore, many family members
working on a ship. Consequently, when a
ship went down, the loss of lives meant
immense tragedy for the entire village.
Faroese fishermen also began to fish near
Greenland in 1925. For many years, the
fisheries near Iceland and Greenland
were the main source of fish for the Faroe
Islands. In addition, fishing commenced
in Canadian waters and in the Barents Sea
as well as in Norwegian and Russian
waters.
Later on, the North Sea gained
importance as a ground for Faroese
fishermen. In the early days the fishermen
used a hand-line to catch cod from depths
of up to 300 m. Each person was paid
according to the number of fish caught.
Until 1970, most of the Faroese catch came
from distant waters. The fishery near the
Faroe Islands was limited to seasonal line
fishing (longline and hand-line) from
smaller fishing vessels.
These vessels supplied fish to the very
modest fillet industry which existed then.
The larger fishing vessels fished in
Icelandic, Greenlandic and Canadian
waters during summer. During winter,
they fished in Faroese waters and landed
their iced catches in British harbours.
At the same time, a large fleet of foreign
trawlers, especially British ones, fished in
Faroese waters. The foreign fleet had its
golden period of expansion in the 1950s.
But, at the start of the 1960s, restrictions on
Faroese distant-water fishery began to
take effect. The introduction of quotas
made Faroese shipowners shift attention
to local grounds, emboldened by the
experience of Aberdonian fishermen who
came to fish near the Faroe Islands, even
though they had to sail all the way back to
Aberdeen to land the catch.
For a start, two trawlers identical to the
ones belonging to the Aberdonians, were
ordered by Faroese fishermen. These
trawlers had limited success. It turned out
that the Faroese, who had been very
skilful at fishing in the waters of other
countries, were inexperienced when it
came to their own fishery.
In fact, when trawling intensified, it
became necessary to hire old Scottish
skippers to train their Faroese
counterparts. The Faroese fishermen soon
became as skilful as the Scottish. The
greater capacity to catch fish was due to
the growth of the Faroese trawler fleet.
This, of course, raises the issue of whether
trawlers have a lung-term harmful effect
on fish stocks, compared to more passive
techniques like longline and hand-line
fishing.
Exclusive zones
Exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of 200
miles were introduced everywhere in the
North Atlantic on 1 January 1977. The
fishing industry had to necessarily adapt.
Fishing vessels cut down on crew size.
Instead of processing the fish on board,
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which called for a large crew, the catch
now had to be landed for processing at the
fillet factory ashore, Where previously the
crew size was 25 men, a typical crew now
consisted of only nine.
The surplus fishermen beganworking in fillet factories. Theycould return home every evening,
instead of being away from their families
for months on end. In record time, about
20 fillet factories sprouted all over the
Faroe Islands and the trawler fleet swelled
to 80.
If the Faroe Islands is compared to, for
instance, Iceland or North Norway, they
appear as a mere little speck on the map,
as are the waters surrounding them. In
comparison, Iceland and North Norway
are whole continents surrounded by vast
oceans. The scanty natural resources of the
Faroe Islands partly explain the crisis
which they faced in the early 1990s.
That the Islands’ natural resources are
more meagre than those of Norway or
Iceland is evident from a comparison of
the groundfish species. Icelandic and
Norwegian fisheries abound in cod.
The situation is quite different in the Faroe
Islands. Normally, it is saithe which is
caught in large quantities, while cod ranks
second. Cod and haddock represent only
a third of the catch of groundfish near the
Faroe Islands. These are expensive species
which command stable prices in global
markets. Saithe, however, fetches a lower
price and must compete with cheaper
species from other parts of the world, like
pollack from Alaska and saithe from the
South Atlantic.
The example of cod illustrates how
difficult it can be for a community to
depend entirely on fishery. Statistics show
that, on average, 30,000 tonnes of cod were
caught yearly near the Faroe Islands until
the 1980s.
However, at the start of the 1990s, the
catch gradually started to decline and
dwindled to 6,000 tonnes by 1993.
Haddock suffered the same fate too.
This decline in catch of the Islands’ most
valuable fish was a catastrophe for the
Faroese community. The effect of lowered
incomes of fishermen, shipowners, fillet
factories and their employees quickly
spread to the rest of the community.
The crisis in the cod and haddock fishery
especially hit the traditional inshore
fishery of smaller fishing vessels using
longlines. For this group of fishermen, it
was indeed a catastrophe.
Serious situation
How serious the situation was can be
gauged by the fact that the International
Council for the Exploration of the Seas
(ICES) advised a complete closure, of the
 
F
a
ro
e Island
s
SAMUDRA JULY 1996 21
cod fishery in Faroese waters. This
closure actually came about
automatically, since there were simply no
cod left to be caught.
The official explanation for thedisappearance of cod was that, Afrom the beginning; stocks had
been so greatly overfished that it was
doubtful whether the species were able to
reproduce at all.
This crisis in the cod fishery showed how
difficult it is, in fact, to predict the size of
fish stocks. In 1994, the Faroese
fishermen’s catch of cod began to increase
considerably. This went against the
biologists’ recommendation of a slow
increase, as cod stocks would only be
rebuilt gradually. Additionally, the
biologists had, as late as 1993, dashed the
fishermen’s hope of a return of the cod in
the same quantities as in the Fast.
Unfortunately for the biologists, the
increase in cod catches continued. This
actually created problems for the
fishermen because their limited by-catch
quotas for cod were fished long before the
other quotas were used up. As a result,
fishing vessels lay idle, since it was almost
impossible to fish without high cod
by-catches.
The fishermen also found that it was not
just limited areas that had more cod than
were ‘supposed’ to exist. Cod were
everywhere in the Faroese waters, a fact
also confirmed through tests conducted
by the Faroese Fishery Research Centre.
The growth of the cod fishery gradually
became so pronounced that the Faroese
government and biologists recommended
a Canadian biologist be engaged for an
independent estimation. The Canadian
biologist concluded that considerably
larger quantities of cod existed than had
been estimated by the Faroese biologists.
The quota for cod in the summer of 1995
was set at 10,000 tonnes, as recommended
by ICES. The quota was subsequently
mooted to range between 15,000 and
17,000 tonnes. However, after political
interference, the final quota was set at
18,500 tonnes.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that
the conservation committee, consisting of
representatives of active fishermen, had
recommended a quota of 19,000 tonnes.
This recommendation was initially
rejected as pure nonsense by the very
people who considered themselves
knowledgeable in these matters.
Revealingly enough, the Canadian
biologist’s estimate of Faroese fish stocks
was considerably closer to that of the
fishing industry itself, rather than that to
which ICES had lent its name.
Large quantities
In fact, there had never been as much cod
in Faroese waters as in recent years. The
trawlers were the first to catch
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unexpectedly large quantities. Then, the
longline fishing vessels, contrary to wide
experience, caught record amounts of cod
in the midst of summer. The Faroese
fishing boats which used hand-lines also
had record catches. From initially
recommending no catch at all in 1993, ICES
soon recommended a catch of 24,000
tonnes, closer to the long-term average
cod catch of 30,000 tonnes per year.
The biologists now admit that whathappened to the cod is a mystery.The cod, which is now caught in
huge quantities, is of a size that did not
exist earlier, contrary to the Faroese
biologists’ claims. The cod must have
migrated to other waters, only to return to
Faroese waters, although no one knows
where they migrated to. However, there is
undoubtedly a correlation between the
disappearance of food in the sea near the
Faroe Islands and the disappearance of the
cod. Significantly enough, when the food
returned, so did the cod.
The fishermen’s experience with saithe,
which was the opposite, leads to the same
conclusion. In 1996, the saithe catch was
significantly less than predicted.
According to biologists, the relatively
good years for saithe have now
disappeared. This raises doubts on
whether there is a correlation between
large amounts of cod and small amounts
of saithe. The experience of fishermen
shows that very seldom do both saithe and
cod exist in plenty at the same time.
Aided by a parasite-induced decline in the
export prices of Faroese fish products,
trade collapsed in the 1990s, affecting
banks too. It became necessary to borrow
money from Denmark to prevent banks
going bankrupt. These loans had severe
conditions, including a quota system
introduced in 1994. One condition for a
quota system to work properly was the
availability of reliable fish stock estimates.
The quotas for cod and haddock were set
on the basis of their stocks being in a
terrible condition. The quota for saithe
was set considering the fact that saithe
stocks were in a reasonably good state.
Accordingly, pair trawlers, which
comprise the largest group of big fishing
vessels, were allocated a large quota of
saithe, but a small quota of cod and
haddock. If the fishery had evolved as it
did the previous year, it would not have
been difficult to stay within the limits of
the quotas, since there was no cod then in
the waters near the Faroese Islands.
However, since it is almost impossible to
reliably estimate the size of fish stocks, the
quota system was absolutely impossible
to manage. The cod by-catches increased
in size, proportionate to the main catch of
saithe. Quite inevitably, the cod
by-catches were fished before the main
catch of saithe. Such a quota system will
inevitably lead to ‘creativity’ among the
fishermen. Cod will be thrown overboard
so that the landed quantities are finally
equivalent to the actual quota. Otherwise,
cod will be ‘renamed’, to be registered as
another species of fish to which no quota
applies.
The fishing industry soon complained
that it could no longer accept the present
system where the quotas allocated had no
relation to the size of the respective fish
stocks. At the request of the fishing
industry, the government appointed a
committee to find a solution to these
problems. There was a lot of scepticism as
to whether a committee composed of
fishery authorities and fishery biologists
could come to an agreement at all.
Contrary to expectations, the committee
arrived at an agreement. In 1996, it
proposed to replace the present quota
system with a regulating system to be
based on (i) area closures to rebuild fish
stocks, and other technical regulations;
and (ii) the number of days vessels can
spend at sea fishing.
In those areas where cod were found, area
closures were instituted either
permanently or for part of the year. In
some instances, the whole fishery was
closed. In others, only trawling was
prohibited. The committee felt that these
conservation measures would prevent
overfishing of stocks. In addition, a limit
to fishing days was introduced for each
fishing vessel. The regulatory system took
effect from 1 June 1996. It is too early to tell
whether this new system will satisfy the
demands made on it.
Planned economy
The Faroese fishing industry has still not
recovered from the crisis. Nevertheless,
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there has been considerable progress.
Until 1989, a subsidy scheme existed and
prices were fixed.
This system, part of a plannedeconomy, contributed to theeconomic collapse. It has since
been replaced by a totally free market
system, based on the suggestions of the
fishermen’s association. The
open-market system led to a considerable
increase in the value of different species
of fish. Now, an increasingly large part of
Faroese groundfish is sold in auctions,
partly controlled by the fishermen’s
association.
As a ‘solution’ to the economic crisis,
creditors forced the Faroese community
to consolidate most fillet factories into
one single company. Afterwards, some of
these factories began to purchase fish,
while others were rented out for different
purposes and still others were closed.
Most Faroese resisted this consolidation.
They were right to be resentful since this
model proved to be an ultimate failure.
It is of utmost importance that the Faroe
Islands develop other industrial activities
to supplement fishing. Politically, there
has been such an effort, but it is a slow
process, though proceeding in the right
direction.
It was in reaction to the formation of the
shipowners’ association that Faroya
Fiskimannafelag (FF), the association of
fishermen, was founded in 1911. The next
year FF succeeded in reaching a collective
agreement with the shipowners, the first
such agreement in the Faroese labour
market.
FF’s aim is to work for fishermen’s
interests. In the first few years, FF
concentrated its energies on improving
the collective agreement with the
shipowners. There were quite a few
disputes in that period and in 1934 the
feelings among the members ran so high
that FF got divided. However, it was
reunited in 1957.
The activities of FF have increasingly
broadened in scope. Much of its work
involves representing fishermen before
public authorities, for instance, in
committees which decide the fishermen’s
in interests. However, the Faroese
authorities felt that FF was exerting too
much influence through its representation
in these committees. Consequently, the
most important committees were
disbanded.
FF has also worked actively with
international trade unions. Since the
1960s, it has been a member of the
International Transport Workers’
Federation (ITF), which has approximately
four million members in around 100
countries. ITF is divided into eight
sections, one of which deals with fishing.
As chairman of the fishing section since
1980, I have had ample opportunities to
represent the Faroese fishermen’s
interests internationally and have a fair
inkling of their problems. Faroese
fishermen are paid according to the
collective agreement between FF and the
shipowners’ association. Unlike most
other workers, fishermen are paid a share
of the value of production or the value of
the catch. 
A typical collective agreement provides
the fishermen with a share of 27 per cent
of the catch value, which is divided
equally among the crew.
Other benefits
The fishermen also receive vacation pay,
12 per cent of one share. The shipowners
also pay a bonus to the officers.
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Needless to add, such a wage system can
create huge variations in the fishermen’s
incomes. Consequently, it has become
necessary to provide the fishermen with
guaranteed incomes, paid through public
or government funds.
The fishermen started to get suchincomes in 1950. This has graduallybeen raised over the years, thanks
to the persistent efforts of FF. Presently, the
wage system works in such away that the
fishermen are guaranteed a minimum
wage equal to the daily wage of an
unskilled worker who works eight hours
a day, or a fifth of a 40-hour week. Many
believe that the guaranteed income is
unreasonably high and there have been
many political attempts to get it reduced.
Nevertheless, FF has resisted such changes
and ensured that the fishermen’s incomes
remain intact. FF also sees possibilities in
Faroese fishermen exploiting more
species of fish. For years it was believed
that there were no fishing opportunities in
Faroese waters, other than conventional
angling and trawling for traditional
species, such as cod, haddock, saithe and
red fish.
Once, a Spanish fishing vessel caught for
illegal fishing in Faroese territory turned
out to contain, to everybody’s surprise,
quantities of monkfish caught with nets.
Nobody in the Faroe Islands had thought
that kind of fishery possible. The illegal
Spanish catch motivated the Faroese
fishermen to harvest monkish in a similar
fashion, and they were successful. As a
secondary effect, other fishing vessels
have started fishing Greenland halibut
with nets, also successfully. After the
traditional financial institutions refused to
loan money, the fishermen’s association
itself helped the fishermen to purchase the
necessary equipment for this kind of
fishing. Among the other species of fish in
Faroese waters which are not fully
exploited is the blue whiting, a very cheap
fish found in plenty in these waters.
It also appears that more fishing
opportunities exist in international
waters, along the Mid-Atlantic Ridge
which stretches from south of
Iceland/Greenland to the Azores.
Research has shown that it is possible to
fish different kinds of new and exotic
species which can fetch good prices.
Experimental fishing with longlines has
succeeded in these waters. Since Faroese
fishermen are very experienced with
longlines, they are best equipped to
explore these new opportunities.
However, the special ground conditions
in these waters necessitate intensive
research before the fishing industry can
make profits. The Faroese authorities have
a huge task in exploring these new
Opportunities.
Based on a SWOT (strengths-weaknesses
opportunities-threats) analysis, it can be
said that the biggest strength of the Faroe
Islands is the existence of a very skilled
workforce of fishermen. The best proof of
this is the demand for Faroese fishermen
to work on board fishing vessels in a
number of foreign countries. It is easier for
Faroese fishermen to get a job on, say, a
Norwegian vessel than in the Faroe
Islands. Another strength of the
workforce is that it is very flexible and
boundaries between trades are totally
unknown. The Faroese accept any work
which is offered. Fishermen, for instance,
do not mind working on board foreign
fishing vessels. Faroese artisans, as
another example, seek employment in
Germany.
Overdependence
The biggest weakness of the Faroe Islands
is its overdependence on fishery,
including aquaculture. Another weakness
has been the unstable political situation in
the Faroe Islands, However, it is
politically agreed that the fishing industry
must be stable. But the geographical
situation of the Islands is a drawback. The
Faroe Islands must establish closer
relations with Europe as quickly as
possible. Politically, there is agreement on
the need for such close ties. 
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This article is written by Oli Jacobsen
who became a fisherman when he
was 14 yeas old and is today the
chairman of Foroya
Fiskimannafelag, the Faroese
Fishermen’s Association
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Aquaculture
Too great a cost
The costs of aquaculture may far outweigh the benefits, 
as a cost-benefit analysis done in El Salvador suggests
In the developing world, aquacultureis a growth industry. The cultivationof shrimp and fish in tanks or
excavated ponds yields high returns and
earns much-needed foreign exchange.
However, it is the location of these tanks
and ponds that critically determines
whether this is a sustainable activity,
whether fragile environments are
degraded or maintained and whether the
net returns are the result of
profit-maximizing or mere cost-shifting.
These are not rarefied questions of
interest only to those pisicologists who
care about fish cultivation or to the
bankers and economists who are
concerned about exports and growth.
Rather, it is a question of sustainability, of
community rights and, ultimately, of
environmental justice.
Consider the case of El Salvador, where,
as in many other parts of the developing
world, a substantial portion of the
remaining mangroves is under threat
from conversion to aquaculture. On the
one hand, this represents an opportunity
to generate income, to produce shrimp
for export and to capitalize on the current
First World penchant for this tasty
delicacy.
On the other hand, the development of
aquaculture contributes to the
irreversible loss of a rich and diverse
ecosystem that is vital to offshore and
estuarine fisheries, an ecosystem that
secures a collection of subsistence and
industrial activities and one that hosts a
multitude of irreplaceable fauna and
flora. This dilemma is at the center of the
development conundrum: What are the
trade-offs between growth and equity?
How much environmental wealth must
be sacrificed to increase GDP? Who
benefits and who loses?
Mangroves comprise a rich, humid
ecosystem which is diverse in fauna and
flora. Marine and estuarine fauna, such as
crab, mussels, shellfish, shrimp and fish,
are essential to coastline communities,
providing them not only a source of
income but also a valuable source of
protein. Mangroves also provide timber
and fuelwood as well as a host of other
non-timber products and environmental
services. Mangrove wood commands a
high market value, being easily worked to
make furniture and for construction
purposes. For many coastal populations,
it is also an important source of fuel and
charcoal.
Mangroves provide security for wild and
plant life, on which coastal and interior
populations depend as a source of protein,
skins, nuts and medicines. Mangroves
also provide environmental functions,
such as barrier protection, drainage and
filtration, stabilizing the coastline and
surrounding agricultural lands and
furnishing them with natural windbreaks,
fresh water and conduits.
Approximately 112,000 Salvadoran
families depend directly on the 26,700
hectares of mangrove and brackish forests
for their living. The conversion of
mangroves to aquaculture ponds
displaces the livelihoods of these families
and denies them traditional access to the
environmental goods and services that the
mangroves provide.
Mangrove conversion
In addition, the conversion of mangroves
for aquaculture threatens other groups
whose economic interests are intimately
connected to the existence of the
mangroves. The mangroves secure the
breeding grounds for industrial shrimp
fishing, an activity which contributes to
approximately 40 per cent of all
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agricultural export revenues. The export
of shrimp alone generated approximately
231 million colons or US$27 million for El
Salvador in 1993.
A little over 4,000 hectares, oralmost 16 per cent, of the totalremaining area of mangrove
forest in El Salvador was estimated to be
prime land for aquaculture. Many private
investors eagerly await the opportunity to
purchase land, obtain permits to clear up
the mangroves, and construct ponds and
tanks for shrimp cultivation.
While there are several analyses of the
profits generated by such an activity, the
conflicts over access rights and the true
environmental costs of conversion have
not been fully explored. This calls for not
a mere calculation of costs and benefits,
but an examination of the value society
places on the environment. It is important
to consider how the costs and benefits are
distributed: asking who wins and who
loses highlights the concentration of
power and the exercise of choice.
Nominally, state legislation protects all
mangrove and brackish forests. These
ecosystems are state property, managed
by the Forestry and Fauna Service (FFS),
and subject to administration by the
Director General of Natural Resources
(DGNR) in the Ministry of Agriculture. The
FFS has the power to authorize, control and
regulate the access to, and use of, all forest
products, both timber and non-timber.
The FFS is responsible for the rational
management of the mangrove systems,
the allocation of access rights and the
overview and implementation of
reforestation efforts.
Despite this, however, the DGNR has little
authority to enforce regulations and is
significantly under-resourced, as it has
been subject to substantial downsizing
under structural adjustment agreements
to reduce the size and cost of government.
Before May1992, petitions for rights to use
forest land to convert to agriculture, salt or
shrimp ponds were made to the FFS in the
Ministry of Agriculture. This agency
would review the claims, and, if
approved, estimate the number of trees to
be cut down, apply a stumpage fee, and
levy a state tax accordingly. In a similar
fashion, usufruct rights to state-owned
land were also granted by the FFS, and
stumpage fees levied if land use entailed
the destruction or loss of tree cover.
Stumpage fee
The stumpage fee paid to the state was 25
centavos (less than US$0.05 in 1992) for
each mangrove tree felled. In May 1992,
this rose to 2.5 colones (US$0.29) per tree.
The stumpage fee was unrelated to the
replacement cost of reforestation or to the
environmental damage suffered as the
result of deforestation. It also remained
too low to provide an effective
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disincentive for illegal felling or
encroachment.
Many aquaculture investors andtimber merchants went aheadand cleared land before
seeking permits to do so. Due to staff and
budget constraints, the stumpage fee
scheme was generally self-reporting,
requiring those who had committed such
an infraction to declare the extent of the
mangroves cleared after the event.
Occasionally, the Forestry Service was
able to verify the amount of mangroves
cleared, but, in general, the stumpage fees
levied were not subject to effective
monitoring or enforcement.
In response to extensive mangrove
deforestation, a logging ban was
introduced in May 1992 that forbade
further clearance and forest conversion.
The ban extends to all uses including
fuelwood, construction and commercial
trade. Licences to convert tracts of forest
to agriculture, shrimp ponds or salt flats
have been temporarily suspended.
However, the logging and clearance ban
applies only to trees which are still being
serviced by the tides. If it is possible to
establish that the tides no longer service
an area of mangrove, an application can
be made to remove the remaining
mangrove trees. There is no preclusion
for the strategic construction of barriers
that may temporarily starve existing
mangroves of tidal waters and enable the
applicant to qualify for land conversion
rights.
In part because of the inability to enforce
existing legislation, and in part because of
initiatives to expand aquaculture and
promote investment in export-oriented
activities, mangrove conversion
continues. It is often assumed that the
most profitable decisions are taken and El
Salvador can only benefit from the
conversion of mangroves for aquaculture.
While planners and policymakers like to
believe that rational decisions are made
about the allocation and use of all goods
and services, reality tends to belie tat
assumption,
Ask an artisanal fisher in El Salvador
whether the benefits from the conversion
of mangrove forests to aquaculture ponds
outweigh the costs, and the reply would
probably be, “Most certainly not.” A
similar reply would most likely come
from fishers elsewhere in the world. But
ask an aquaculturist and he would
probably reply that it depends acutely on
how the ponds are managed and the
intensity of the activity. Ask an investor in
aquaculture and he would most likely
reply that he neither knows nor cares.
Bottom lines
This is because investors are concerned
about their bottom lines—the profits that
they reap—and as long as they do not bear
El
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the costs of environmental degradation,
and are not forced to compensate those
who have lost livelihoods, and as long as
their .profits are not compromised, they
have no reason to be concerned.
To answer the question of whether
benefits outweigh costs, a group of
economists, socio-biologists and artisanal
fishers decided to calculate the costs and
benefits from aquaculture. We chose a site
in western El Salvador in the Department
of La Union in the Gulf of Fonseca.
The idea was simple- We would calculate
the value of the forest assuming that it is
deforested at current rates, and the value
of all the benefits that it would secure if it
were to remain the same size and not
converted. We would compare these
values with those in which all the land
potentially available for conversion to
aquaculture was excavated to form
shrimp ponds.
These three different scenarios were
labelled: the current management
strategy; the partial conversion strategy;
and the sustainable management strategy.
We would account for all the costs and
benefits, the loss of fuelwood and timber,
the loss of fish in the estuaries and at sea,
and compare these to the benefits
generated by selling a high value-added
product which earns foreign exchange.
The approach we chose synthesized
qualitative and quantitative methods,
using rapid rural and participatory
appraisal techniques and survey
instruments to gather information.
We constructed a household survey to
develop estimates of the demand for
timber and fuelwood and the use of other
forest products such as herbs, spices,
mammals and crustacea. We undertook a
fishing survey to estimate the returns from
marine and estuarine fishing activities,
These data were added to Ministry of
Agriculture’s data on industrial and
artisanal fisheries. We surveyed shrimp,
farms and collected data on yields, shrimp
larvae production, costs of operation and
profits. We gathered data on the price of
fuelwood and timber. All this information
was combined to develop a measure of the
value of the mangroves over time, taking
account of their different growth and
regeneration rates.
The data was used to estimate the
importance of mangroves for marine
fisheries. Since mangroves provide the
breeding grounds for many marine and
estuarine fish, the total production of fish
is intimately related to the extent and
density of the mangrove areas.
Using multiple regression techniques, we
demonstrated that the size of the artisanal
and industrial catch was a function of the
total extension of mangroves. This
allowed us to monetize the fisheries
production that the mangroves
supported.
A group of local community members,
fishers, NGOs and forestry service
employees helped design the hypothetical
sustainable management option. A
harvesting scheme was developed
that-would enable fuelwood and timber
to be harvested by the local community. A
compensation scheme was devised to
incorporate local fuelwood traders into
the management of the mangroves to
ensure that illegal deforestation did not
continue.
Each household was expected to purchase
an improved fuelwood or propane gas
stove using a soft loan facility operated by
the management committee and financed
from income collected by the Ministry of
Agriculture for industrial drag-net
trawling violations.
Since costs and benefits occur over time,
they must be discounted to reflect a single
value that has meaning at one point in
time. A dollar today is not the same as one
dollar tomorrow. Therefore, all figures
were discounted by the real rate of interest
on long-term government bonds, 7.08 per
cent, so as to express them in terms of
current values.
Costs and benefits
After all costs and benefits were
accounted for, both for the conversion
option and for the sustainable
management option, we were able to
compare the net benefits (benefits minus
costs) and answer the question: do the
final benefits from aquaculture outweigh
the costs?
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We are able to conclude that the net
present value of the sustainable
management strategy exceeds that of the
other two management options. The net
present value of benefits reaped under
sustainable management exceeds that
generated under partial mangrove
conversion by US$ 73,120,115 (in 1992,
$1=8.7 colons).
If the period for which these benefits were
calculated was longer, say 100 years
instead of 56, the benefits from the
sustainable management option would
far exceed those from the other proposed
management strategies.
In this light it would seem that conversion
of mangrove areas to aquaculture farms
needs to be reconsidered. Evidently,
mangroves need not be deforested to
cultivate shrimp.
There are alternatives for the design and
operation of aquaculture ponds that do
not degrade the environment, displace
artisanal fishers and cause the irrevocable
loss of biodiversity.
There are other means of assigning access
rights to the mangroves and allowing for
the continued, yet sustainable, use of these
forests. Concerns about environmental
justice and sustainability should guide
our choices about all decisions to
transform, degrade or utilize natural
environments.
The chorus of investors and exporters
who champion growth at the expense of
equity and short-term profits at the
expense of biodiversity must not drown
the voices of communities whose
livelihoods are lost nor the voices of those
who value the continued existence of
mangroves.
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This article is written by Sarah
Gammage, an economist with the
International Centre for Research
on Women, Washington DC.
Table: Net Present Value of the Different Scenarios from 1994 to 2050 at
Current Market Prices (Thousands of 1992 colons)
Mangrove Management Options Net Present Value in Thousands of Colons
Current Management Strategy
Fuelwood and timber
Artisanal shrimp and fish
Industrial shrimp
Rustic salt and shrimp
Total
17,552
718,608
859,236
3,275
1,598,671
Partial Mangrove Conversion
Clearance logging
Fuelwood and timber
Artisanal shrimp and fish
Industrial shrimp
Shrimp ponds
Total
55,445
10,010
700,981
724,514
105,721
1,596,671
Sustainable Management Strategy
Fuelwood and timber
Artisanal shrimp and fish
Industrial shrimp
Rustic salt and shrimp
Total
23,809
761,652
1,444,080
3,275
2,232,816
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Ceara fishermen
Sailing for a cause
A spirited campaign in the shape of a 76-day voyage of the S.O.S.
Sobrevivencia highlighted the plight of the fishermen of Ceara, Brazil
The jangadeiros, fishermen ofnortheast Brazil who sail on smallrafts, have had considerable
impact on Brazil’s history. In 1884, Ceara
was the first Brazilian state to abolish
slavery. Propelling this path breaking
decision was a year-long protest by the
jangadeiros, led by Francisco Jose do
Nascimento, the ‘Dragon of the Seas’,
who was the founder of the Liberation
Society of Ceara.
At the time, Ceara, located in Brazil’s airy
northeast, was going through a severe
drought which hit agriculture in the
region. Not needing slaves, and to help
pay their rising debts, the owners began
selling their surplus slaves to the state of
Pernambuco down the coast. The
jangadeiros, with their handy jangadas,
were needed to transfer the merchandise
to the ships anchored out at sea.
No one reckoned with the high moral
standards of the humble fishermen who
had decided on their own that slavery
was unjust. To demonstrate their will, the
jangadeiros began a boycott with the
historic phrase: “No porto do Ceara nao
se embarcam mais escravos!” (No more
slaves will embark from the ports of
Ceara)
The jangadeiros held fast against threats
by the Emperor and his military. To show
their unity, the ‘Dragao do Mar’ even
travelled by ship to Rio de Janeiro in 1884
with a gift for the Emperor Dom Pedro II:
the jangada ’Liberty’. Even though the
Emperor refused to see him, the trip was
a political success for the abolitionists, as
be was given a hero’s welcome by the
people of the capital.
In 1941, it was the turn of ‘Jacare (the
Alligator) to sail to Rio de Janeiro with
three other fishermen from Fortaleza.
This time, the target was the Military
Regime of Getulio Vargas, which was
strongly supported by the US. The four
men sailed 61 days on a raft made of six
tree trunks to tell the President about the
miserable working conditions of
jangadeiros and their need to be included
in the country’s social security system.
The voyage caught the attention of the
movie director, Orson Welles, who was in
Brazil at the time making a film on
Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbour Policy’.
Welles was so captivated by the courage
of the jangadeiros that he decided to make
a film about their struggle instead, doing
so against the wishes of the State
Department, the Brazilian government,
and his then employer, Rio. Rio fired
Welles, who proceeded with the project
only to experience tragedy.
While re-enacting the jangadeiros arrival in
Rio, a large wave overturned their jangada
and, before Welles’ very eyes, Jacare was
carried off by a wave and drowned. The
film project was canned and only
completed 52 years later, released by
Paramount under the title, ‘It’s All True’,
Just as a film team was in Ceara for the
final shooting of ‘It’s All True’, a new
protest movement came to life in the small
community of Prainha do Canto Verde.
Work had begun with the fishermen in
1991 to liberate them from a wicked
network of intermediaries that was
exploiting their hard and dangerous work
and pocketing huge profits by buying
their catches of fish and lobster at
manipulated prices.
Fishermen’s co-operative
After less than a year of working to
establish the co-operative of the
fishermen, it became clear that there were
even greater evil forces at work to keep the
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fishing communities in extreme poverty.
Real estate speculators were busy buying
up peach property using corruption and
threats, while, at sea, a growing fleet of
motor boats had started to capture
ever-growing quantities of lobster using
ill-equipped divers and capturing
ever-smaller juvenile lobsters. (Both
diving and catching juvenile lobsters are
prohibited by fisheries regulations.)
The conflict between artisanalfishermen on their fragile jangadasand armed bandits on motor boats
kept growing. The authorities failed to
intervene and enforce regulations, even as
four fishermen lost their lives from enemy
fire at sea.
The adventurous dream of one young
fisherman, Edilson, to sail to Rio de
Janeiro, was probably inspired by ‘Jacare’
and his own grandfather, who together
with two other fishermen from Prainha do
Canto Verde, sailed to Belem, Para on a
14-day trip in 1928. The idea to unite the
fishermen of various communities and
supporting NGOs gave the trip the sense
that it lacked. So, in three short months,
the logistics for the trip and the protest
campaign were planned and financed.
A week before the scheduled departure,
the jangada and the crew were presented
to the press at the fishing port of Fortaleza.
They made the headlines of all the
newspapers and TV stations, Taken by
surprise, the Captain of the Port Authority
advised that the navy had overruled the
authorization for the trip given by the
captain responsible for the area of Prainha
do Canto Verde, implying that the trip
should not take place. But there was no
way that the crew, the organizers or
supporters of the protest trip would heed
the advice.
On 4 April 1993, loaded with emotion,
tears, encouragement and worries,
fishermen from ports far away came in
their jangadas to escort the S.O.S.
Sobrevivencia on the first leg of the
voyage. TV crews, photographers and
reporters gave the simple fishermen a
preview of what lay ahead of them;
hundreds of interviews and TV talk shows
on the more than 3,000 km that lay ahead
of them.
Absent, as always when things get hot,
were most of the representatives of the
state, municipal and federal governments.
But the speakers who wished the sailors
well, were very clear about where the
problem lay—the rich are above the law,
and few people waste their time looking
for justice for the poor.
On its way
Shortly after 12 noon that day, the fishers’
favourite priest, Padre Marco, celebrated
mass and christened the jangada to send it
on its way, well protected by the One who
Cares. The small craft was rolled down the
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beach, while thousands of well-wishers,
even the hardiest fishermen among them,
let tears flow. Edilson (Fonseca
Fernandes), the Captain Mamede (Dantes
de Lima), crew members Francisco (da
Silva Valente) and Francisco (Abilio
Pereira da Silva) were busy tacking the
wooden mast to sail through the surf and
gain the wide open sea, accompanied by
jangadas from neighbouring
communities, on the first leg of the trip.
The trip had been carefully planned by a
small group of young fishery engineers
from the local university and volunteers
from NGOs working on issues of fishery,
ecology and human rights. Twenty stops
were planned along the coast of Brazil;
contacts with a variety of groups,
fishermen’s colonies, women’s and
human rights groups and other
movements were planned at each port.
Press releases were ready to brief
journalists on the scope of the trip and
inform them about the great range of
problems facing coastal communities all
over Brazil.
While the men started to prepare for the
unexpected, two young women were
getting ready to follow the route in a
small two-door Volkswagen. Loaded to
the last square inch with pamphlets,
background material, press releases,
petition forms, S.O.S. hats and T-shirts to
be sold to raise funds along the way, and
their own little belongings, they took off,
after a three-day delay.
Michelle Scharer, who holds a degree in
zoology from the University of Central
Florida, had come down with fever on the
day the trip was planned to start. Her
travel companion was Marlene Fernandes
de Lima, then president of the Villages
Residents Association. Both were in their
early twenties and faced a formidable
challenge for the next two months,
meeting the press, ensuring supplies for
the jangada, organizing protest meetings
and communicating with Operation
Headquarters in Fortaleza. To fill the gap
of three days, I went ahead to Redonda,
Icapui, to meet the navigators arid the
members of the community and then
drove to the third stop to organize local
support, before heading back to hand over
to the girls.
Back at Prainha, the courage of the crew
and the girls rubbed off on the fishermen.
On 6 April, they went on strike to protest
against delayed payments and the low
lobster prices offered by buyers. They
went back to sea only when the price went
up and the producers were paid in cash.
Storm at sea
The jangadeiros faced their first serious
problem when they got caught in a
24-hour storm at sea. Used to facing many
a storm during fishing, they weathered
this one too.
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Meanwhile, Michelle and Marlene had
made contact with the Sisters of the
Convent and the fishermen’s
representative in Toros, Rio Grande do
Norte, unlikely allies who were fighting
the local city hail which had sided with a
foreigner who was terrorizing fishermen
with armed guards against using ‘his’
beachfront property for landing their
boats.
It was Holy Friday afternoon when, inthe middle of the procession, SisterAurea announced over the public
address system, the arrival of the jangada.
It was a great reception for four very tired
fishermen, who had endured two
sleepless nights, and also attended to
Mamede, still running a high fever.
Although not fully recovered, they
decided to sail on, after spending three
days in this hospitable community and
learning more about the local
problems—it seemed just like home, full
of real estate speculators and pirates
diving after lobsters.
Natal was the first capital city on the next
segment of their trip. They arrived there
on 14 April and got the first taste of the
hard life of celebrities—interviews with
four TV stations, three local radios and
four newspapers. The navy sergeant made
up for his superiors when he told the crew
that everybody at the port authority
supported the trip. After a grand
reception in Cabedelo in the State of
Paraiba, complete with dazzling
fireworks, a parade and a show organized
by the local fishing co-operative, they
headed for Pernambuco and the historical
city of Olinda.
The girls arranged for a dentist’s
appointment to repair Edilson’s root canal
that had been bothering him for the last
four days, while the jangada was working
its way towards Olinda. The
representative of the Fishermen’s Pastoral
arranged meetings with local groups and
helped Michelle and Marlene collect
signatures for the petition, and sell hats
and T-shirts.
Then they went by sea and over dirt roads
through the States of Alagoas and Sergipe,
ahead to the country’s largest coastal
State, Bahia. The problems that were
discussed with the communities in
different ports invariably turned to
pollution of coastal areas and wetland
from industry or sugar cane plantations.
There were also problems relating to
fishing by divers, trawlers or those using
dynamite.
Another common problem was real estate
speculation that drove fishermen’s
families from their homes and threw them
back into the hinterland, in some cases
forcing them to travel over two hours by
bus to go to work, while earlier they used
to live right beside their boats.
Exactly one month into the trip, the S.O.S.
Sobrevivencia appeared over the horizon
for a triumphant arrival in Salvador,
Bahia, the city on the Bay of Saints. The
crew got a hero’s welcome at the Olodum
in the historic centre of Salvador, where
the world-renowned carnival takes place.
Olodum is not only the home of famous
rhythm groups formed of kids who have
come off the streets and regularly perform
on tour in the us, Europe and Japan.
Olodum is a social institution founded by
blacks to help them win back pride in their
origin. Street children get a chance to go to
school, art and music clinics.
Tuesday just happened to be rehearsal
day for Olodum and thousands of people
had filled the club in historical Pelourinho.
The six adventurers got a standing
ovation from the crowd and the band beat
the maximum volume out of the drums.
That night it seemed that all the Negroes
of Salvador were fishermen and all the
fishermen of Brazil were black, two
neglected groups of suffering people that
need to recover their pride, unite and fight
for their existence.
The captain of the port in Salvador was not
so hospitable and required the jangadeiros
to sign a waiver of responsibility to relieve
the navy of any blame in case they should
sink. But, on the whole, most of the
captains along the route were gracious.
Some even invited the crew for dinner at
home and praised their courage and spirit.
Letter of praise
Ironically, we got a letter from the Public
Relations Officer of the Minister of the
Navy in Brasilia, commending us on the
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initiative and offering any kind of
support and assistance—perhaps a case
of what happens when the right hand
does not know what the left is doing.
As the trip went on, it became clear how
important the female support team was
for the success of the campaign and the
well-being of the sailors. They looked
after just about everything, functioning as
look-outs, escorts, shoppers, public
relations agents and nurses, while facing
thousands of kilometres (6,700 km in 74
days) of dirt roads, often in very
inhospitable areas and far from
habitation.
For the campaigners, the coast of Bahia
seemed to have no end, through 16 days
of sailing and 10 days of being stuck in the
fashionable tourist resort of Forty Seguro
due to bad weather. But it was also a time
to make friends in new places and to talk
shop. Both Marnede and Francisco
(Abillo) had earlier fished in the south on
industrial fishing ships and so knew
some of the areas that lay ahead of thorn.
Back in Fortaleza, we were busy
co-ordinating between the support team
on the road, the concerned families of the
crew, the press and the participating
NGOs. In May, we organized four
workshops on the campus of the Federal
University of Ceara on the themes of the
campaign irresponsible fishing of lobster;
real estate speculation; neglect of
artisanal fishing; and irresponsible
tourism development.
The workshops attracted a good number
of experts, students and others interested.
Government representatives were invited
to present their points of view, but were
hard pressed for good answers. The
workshops were the basis for concrete
proposals that would be presented to all
the interested parties and sent to the
President of Brazil, Itamar Franco, with
signed petitions—over 2,000 were
collected.
The President did not respond to the
request from the fishermen for a personal
audience in Brasilia to present the petition.
The Governor of the State of Ceara did not
appear and never responded to the
proposals. To a foreign journalist, he
declared that the jangadeiros are long
overdue for display in museums.
The support of the media in Fortaleza was
impressive. We were invited to several
morning news talk shows and given
ample time to present the various aspects
of the campaign. TV channels, radio and
newspapers gave regular updates on the
trip down the coast,
Home stretch
After crossing the State of Bahia, the
campaigners were on the home stretch.
Both the water and wind were getting
colder, as they were approaching winter
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in Rio. Another weather-imposed stop in
Vitoria cost the crew five days of precious
travel time.
From then on, there were several difficult
spots, with treacherous currents and
crosswinds. It took all the experience of
Mestre Mamede to avoid a rocky island
that seemed to be on collision course with
the jangada. This was probably the scariest
moment for the four intrepid travellers.
In Rio, the preparations for the team’s
arrival were in high gear and everything
was planned for Saturday, 12 June, with a
fleet of boats ready to escort the S.O.S.
Sobrevivencia across the Bay of
Guanabara. But the lord and master of the
skies once more did not co-operate.
The result was heavy clouds and no wind
to move the jangada. But on the morning
of Wednesday, 16 June, Rio de Janeiro
awoke in all its scenic splendour to see,
despite no winds, the jangada working its
way towards the Pracxa XV (Square 15) in
the centre of the city, with 15 video
cameras shooting its progress from the
accompanying schooner.
TV personalities, and songwriter Doryval
Cayimmi, were at hand to receive the four
modest fishermen and their two fighting
ladies, who had travelled 76 days in a
memorable campaign, yearning for
somebody, somewhere to listen to the call
of the fishermen of Brazil. The expedition
ended on 19 June, after a three-and-a-half
hour flight back to Fortaleza and a hero’s
reception in Prainha do Canto Verde that
reunited all those—whether at sea, on the
road or waiting anxiously back
home—who had given a small part of
their lives for a cause.
Despite the negative response of
government officials, the fishermen of
Ceara did not give up and, over the years,
kept up the pressure by forging new
alliances to unite the fishing communities.
The resulting resurgence of the
fishermen’s movement has since yielded
some surprising results that are bound to
have a lasting and positive impact on
artisanal fishing in Brazil.
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and father of the intrepid Michelle
mentioned in the story
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Lake Victoria fisheries
Throwing the dice
The development of fisheries in Lake Victoria 
seems set to follow global trends of overcapitalization
Fishermen all over the world willagree that fishing is a game ofchance played with three dice: good
weather, good catch and good markets. If
all three are tossed in your favour, then
your earnings will be good. Inmost cases,
however, at least one of the dice will be
loaded against you: despite good weather
and a good catch, unfavourable market
prices can reduce your earnings.
Likewise, despite good weather and a
favourable market place, your earnings
may be reduced if you fail to make a good
catch.
The judicious use of technology can load
this game of chance in your favour,
granted, of course, that you have the
necessary resource rights, technical skills,
knowledge of weather, fish stocks and
available market outlets.
For example, a more seaworthy boat and
motorized propulsion can reduce the risk
of bad weather curtailing fishing. A more
powerful fishing unit with more
equipment like nets and fish finding
devices can reduce the risk of a poor
market by improving the quality of the
catch and making it possible to stock it for
longer periods. Improvements in
technology can also make fishing safer
and less arduous for fishworkers.
Some of these issues are evident in Lake
Victoria, which has, for instance,
witnessed significant loss of life due to
boats capsizing. More seaworthy boats
would prevent this. Likewise, motorized
propulsion would take the backbreaking
toil out of rowing and help the fishermen
get home sooner.
In most cases, it is the technology
innovators (those fishers who first take
the risk of using a new technique or
fishing method) who gain the greatest
advantage in the game of chance.
However, as more people invest in the
new technology, the competitive edge is
lost, and soon everyone is using the new
technology. The initial increased earnings
of the Innovators may have enabled them
to pay off their capital costs and
accumulate wealth. The imitators, who
follow, however, are always likely to be at
a disadvantage. As catches diminish (or
incomes reduce as markets get saturated),
earnings may not be enough to pay for
increased running and maintenance costs,
let alone make up the greater capital
required for the initial investment.
This can be illustrated with the case of
Lake Victoria’s fisheries. The introduction
of flax and, subsequently, nylon gm-nets
had a major impact on fish catches in Lake
Victoria. Initially, significant surplus
catches were made, but soon, as more
people invested in the nets, catch rates
dropped.
It has been estimated that between the
early 1900s and 1953, the total length of
gill-nets rose from zero to 2,000 kin,
putting huge pressure on stocks and
dramatically reducing catch rates. Thanks
to their lightness and strength which
made them easier to handle and use over
rocky bottoms, the nylon nets enabled
fishers to reach previously inaccessible
fishing grounds.
However, it also pushed the fishing
pressure beyond the level where stocks
could replenish themselves. Catch rates
soon became unviable. Thus, tilapia
catches declined from rates of 25 fish per
net when gill-nets were first introduced, to
less than one fish per net in the 1960s.
Signs of overfishing
Similarly, over the last 10 years, there have
been increasing signs of overfishing and a
K
en
ya
 
38 SAMUDRA JULY 1996
reduced catch per unit effort in the two
main fisheries. Although statistical data is
quite limited, in the case of the Nile perch
fishery, both average catches and average
size of fish have reduced considerably.
Both the omena and tilapia fisheries also
show evidence of reduced catch rates.
These are the classic symptoms of
overfishing.
Technology choice and technicalchange can also be exclusive.Increasing requirements for capital
or new technical skills may favour outside
investors over local fishing communities.
In most instances, technology change in
modem fisheries (or the ‘modernization’
of fisheries) has led to substantial
additional investments in capital, leading
to greater industrialization, vertical
integration and, in many cases,
overcapitalization in fisheries. Modern
technology has dismantled traditional
barriers to entry in most fisheries.
Generally, the modernization process in
fisheries has not recognized traditional,
community-based regulatory and
management systems. Modernization has
transformed many fishery resources from
community-managed to open-access
ones. These throw up several implications
for sustainability. Open and unregulated
access to resources has resulted in
unhealthy competition, and has
encouraged the use of non-selective and
environmentally destructive fishing gear.
With the boom in the Nile perch and omena
fisheries over the last 10 to 15 years, such
a trend is discernible in Lake Victoria.
The additional capital and running costs
needed in modern fisheries tend to
encourage an industrialization process
which invariably leads to fewer work
places (technology becomes capital-rather
than labour-intensive), centralization of
ownership of fishing assets, and the
vertical integration of the fish catching,
marketing and processing sectors.
Fishing communities become displaced
and disadvantaged. Decentralized
communities of owner-operators, fish
processors and vendors become replaced
by distant, company-owned vessels and
factories. With increasing fishing pressure
and more competitive markets, the
economic returns to fishing reduce. The
emphasis then shifts to high-value and
value-added fish products for distant
markets or bulk catches of species of
relatively low economic value to be used
as animal feed.
Market-driven
In the end, it becomes the market which
drives the fishery and local control is lost.
With efforts concentrating on the export of
the Nile perch and on omena for animal
feed, export processing plants and animal
feed factories are dominating fishing
communities. Less fish is now available
for local consumption. This indicates that
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Lake Victoria’s fishery is well on its way
to being a market-driven, rather than
community-controlled, fishery.
At this stage in its development,
technology change in Lake Victoria’s
fishery has serious implications for the
survival of its fishing communities, for
the number of people it can employ, and
for the supplies of valuable protein-rich
food for local consumption. Fisheries
management can not, be left to the
mechanisms of the market, neither can
regulation of technology be left to
ineffectual state laws.
How can fishing communities make
appropriate technology choices to
become more productive, without
undermining traditional management
systems and depleting the resource base?
The use of capital-intensive, technically
efficient hardware for short-term
economic gain tends to increase
competitiveness, and works against
sustainability.
’Intermediate technology’ options
(between artisanal and capital-intensive
fisheries) may offer a ‘middle road’ and
provide for a more equitable
development of fisheries. Technology
hardware, on its own, can not solve the
problem. Appropriate delivery and
support systems are also needed, as are
institutions to regulate the use of
technology, and social organizations to
distribute the benefits.
This is why it is important to support
initiatives like those of the Kenya-based
NGO, OSIENALA, aimed at community
participation in management,
organization and empowerment, and
why they need to be linked to any future
technology developments in the Lake
Victoria fisheries of Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania.
Global trends
Without such initiatives, Lake Victoria’s
fisheries are likely to follow the trend set
by fisheries in other parts of the world:
increasing centralization and
concentration of ownership and
management, concentration on
high-value fish for export and bulk
catches for fishmeal, fewer workplaces,
reduced food security, and increased
pauperization in fishing communities.
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South Africa
A Marine Fisheries Policy
The White Paper on South African fisheries, released on 
19 June, spells out the following management policy objectives
It is a policy objective that South Africashould develop and maintain acost-effective fisheries management
structure with a broadly recognized
acceptability that ensures that: 
• fisheries management in South
Africa, within the constraints of
limited human and financial
resources, be conducted on a
multidisciplinary basis and make
use of the best available
knowledge. Special attention
should be given to broadening the
scope and increasing the effort of
fisheries research within
economic, social, cultural and
other relevant non-biological
disciplines, and to integrating
their results with those of
numerical and biological studies
in order to advance a
well-balanced, comprehensive
basis for important decisions on
policy options;
• all fisheries sector practices
conform to relevant international
standards, laws and treaties;
opportunities for meaningful
co-operation between South
Africa and those countries
interested in helping development
of the local fishing industry and its
associated infrastructure be
investigated with a view to
enhancing the industry’s
development;
• levels and patterns of exploitation,
determined on the basis of best
available scientific information, do
not jeopardize the soundness of
the resource, its environment or
the ecosystem on which
biodiversity and long-term
optimal depend; sustainable
yields
• long-term management plans,
which include operational
management procedures, be
developed to ensure optimal
utilization of all significant living
marine resources;
• the harvesting of one species does
not endanger the continued
existence, or cause the substantial
depletion of any other species, and
that a variety of regulatory
measures be introduced to avoid
such dangers, including the full
protection of species, MPAs
(Marine Protected Areas),
restrictions on fishing gear and
methods of harvesting;
• fishing sectors be subject to
environmental audits where
applicable, and investigations on
potential detrimental effects on
marine and estuarine species and
their environment from activities
causing environmental
disturbance or pollution be
initiated or continued;
• implications of an economic and
socioeconomic nature, ensuing
from various policy options, are
properly identified, analyzed and
taken into account when decisions
are made;
• the principle of national
co-ordination and control over the
use of South Africa’s living marine
resources and related research
activities be entrenched, but on a
basis of involving other authorities
in cases of non-mobile marine
resources, which occur relatively
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nearshore and which do not
overlap boundaries. When this is
practicable, it may be necessary to
involve networks of scientific
institutions to assist in the process.
The inherent potential of
introducing co-management
structures shall be given special
attention in this respect;
• cost-effective capability and capacity
is put in place to enforce fishery
regulations effectively, to exercise
adequate overall monitoring, control
and surveillance and to provide for
sufficient contributions to public
education, to ensure that the extent
and practices of all exploitation of
South Africa’s living marine
resources are consistent with the
principle of optimum sustainable
utilization. A well-functioning
Vessel Monitoring System, tailored
to be compatible also with future
regional needs in Southern Africa, is
considered an essential tool in this
respect;
• institutional structures of fisheries
management in South Africa
adequately meet functional
demands linked to theft core role
of providing the capability and the
capacity for the effective
implementation of the fisheries
policy by sound management.
Furthermore, institutional
structures should minimize
bureaucracy but allow adequate
opportunities for user and interest
groups to raise concerns and make
inputs to decision making, and
should also promote the necessary
research, advice and channels of
communication for the
implementation of responsible
fisheries management through
national and provincial
participation and representation.
Empowerment of authority and
lines of communication between
institutional levels and bodies
should reflect realities of policy
and management responsibility,
thereby fostering realistic
management accountability and
transparency;
• an ethic of training in its broadest
sense be promoted within the
fishing industry and its associated
community;
• adequate consultation take place
with representative, visible
industry organizations and
democratic public bodies, allied to
open, transparent administrative
procedures;
• an integrated strategy of
development and a coherent plan
of strategy implementation,
including the addressing of
appropriate funding schemes, be
developed in order to create a
favourable environment for
fisheries sector development.
Some of the features of a fisheries
sector development strategy
should be, first, to adopt short-,
medium- and long-term
perspectives, realizing that
processes of development are
difficult and complex and that
they take time, and second, to
support the establishment of an
adequately funded specialized
unit for fisheries and mariculture
sector development (UFMD).
Special attention should be given
through this development plan to
schemes of, and support for,
education, training and transfer of
technology; the organizing of
some decentralized structure of
advisory service units to cater for,
for instance, support to improving
local capacity of organizing and
managing small business
enterprises, disseminating
information related to the supply
of goods and services, markets,
research, fisheries, mariculture
and other governmental
management institutions;
• the establishment of basic
infrastructure facilities in order to
minimize post-harvest loss,
improve on the soundness of
working conditions, product
range and product quality; 
• the undertaking of a
comprehensive study on potential
opportunities of developing a
wide range of mariculture and/or
fish farming/sea ranching
activities, with a view to adopting
any new technology continuously
becoming available worldwide to
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prevailing South African
conditions. Possibilities of
attracting external donor
financing and expertise to
facilitate such a study should be
investigated.
It must be emphasized that all these need
to be put in place to achieve the long-term
sustainable utilization of all natural living
marine resources of South Africa, and of
the environment in which they exist and
in which mariculture activities may
occur, to the benefit of the country as a
whole,
The human resource needs of the fishing
industry are multidisciplinary in nature.
A culture should be encouraged where
labour is seen not merely as a cost of
production but as mankind with the
dignity this entails. Good labour relations
will be promoted.
Fair, humane and acceptable labour
practices, workers’ rights, job creation
and security, sound working conditions,
health and safety, and welfare benefits of
employees in the industry will be
encouraged and, where appropriate,
regulated. It is necessary to register all
fisherfolk. Therefore, it will be necessary
to find suitable parameters in order to
establish a clear definition of a ‘fisher’ and
the level of activities which make him or
her eligible for registration as a full-time,
or if deemed appropriate, a part-time
fisher.
It is a policy objective that holders of
fishing rights and other fishing industry
operators should provide acceptable
conditions of employment for all
employees.
Within the Government’s administrative
structures, policy matters related to labour
and employment in all sectors of the
economy are the special responsibility of
the Department of Labour.
The Ministry and the Department will,
however, within the constraints of its
specified statutory terms of reference, its
scarce human and financial resources, and
its obligation to give priority to core
activities and responsibilities, continue to
lend support to efforts at fostering
improved relations between fishing
industry employers and their labour force.
If required, it can also contribute in a
facilitating and liaising role to improving
communication and relations between the
Department of Labour and representative
organizations in the fishing industry.
Legal report
The full legal report identifies the
instances in which it will be necessary to
amend the present Sea Fisheries Act in
order to achieve the policy objectives. It
also indicates those instances where the
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policy recommendations are not
achievable by means of legislation.
The more important changesproposed to am end the Act includeinserting in the Act, a statement of
policy objectives and principles in order to
ensure that the Act would be interpreted
and applied in accordance with the
policies identified in the policy itself,
specifically with regard to the RDP and
certain recent developments in
international law; specific
recommendations are also made for
legislative changes to achieve the policy’s
objectives in respect of access rights, in
particular commercial access rights,
recreational fishing, subsistence fishing,
foreign fishing and mariculture.
With regard to Institutional Structures,
the Legal Task Team based its findings on
the provisions contained in the original
proposal submitted to the Minister in June
1996, because an approved version of the
White Paper dealing with this topic was
not available when their report was being
drafted. Certain changes of a
philosophical nature would now be
necessitated.
On resource management, the Legal Task
Team recommended the incorporation of
management plans into legislation.
Certain changes are also proposed to
strengthen the enforcement aspects of the
present Act. These include strengthening
the penalties available and increasing the
powers of fisheries inspectors,
introducing provisions on the use of
evidence gained from vessel monitoring
systems, as well as the inclusion of a new
offence of failure to stow fishing gear
correctly.
A considerable number of amendments
would be required to bring the present Sea
Fishery Act into line with the policy
objectives.
If these amendments are introduced, they
would be of such a technical nature that
they would have the effect of introducing
further complexities to the Act.
The Department accordingly
recommends that the present Sea Fishery
Act be repealed and that a new law with
respect to utilization of living marine
resources be drafted. However, it is
further considered, in any event, that a
new Act is justified in view of the new
policies that need to be introduced.
An example would be the need to
establish a Commercial Public Company,
as outlined in 4.6.1.1. New policies will
only be fully effective in the context of a
new Act. With a new Act, it will be
possible to achieve both the necessary
degree of transparency as well as ensuring
effective participation in the
decision-making process.
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Paper on a Marine Fisheries Policy
for South Africa, prepared in May
1997, and officially released on 19
June 1997.
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Senegalese fisheries
The enemy is not just ‘out there’
A trip around Senegal brings forth same disturbing 
perceptions about the common enemy that confronts fisheries
In the Woluf language, ‘yaboye’ meansthe sardinelle and mackerel caught inplenty by the coastal fishers of
Senegal. Yaboye is the people’s food,
bought and sold daily on the beaches of
the fishing villages of this West African
nation. It ferments in the brine of the vats
of the women fishmongers, after being
landed at night in Gut Ndyar. It is peddled
in the markets of Thies and it is
transported to Mali and Burkina Faso.
Yaboye is pervasive and an essential
ingredient for the food security of the
Senegalese people. It is a resource that
supports thousands of fishing pirogues,
not to mention a cast of thousands of
handlers, brokers, buyers, sellers and
processors. It also is what the
hardworking families of Senegal eat.
So why would the Government of Senegal
place yaboye on the table of negotiations
with the Europeans over a new fisheries
agreement? Why would they sign an
agreement against the wishes of CNPS
(Collectiv National des Pecheus du
Senegal), the organization representing
the men and women fishers and
fishworkers of Senegal?
Why would the Senegalese authorities
allow 22 European industrial seiners to
come to Senegalese waters every year to
take 25 million kg of this fish for sale and
consumption in Europe? Why would the
authorities agree to such large allocations,
when they know that enforcement is well
nigh impossible? (The President of CNPS,
Arona Daigle, believes that thrice the
authorized amounts will be finally
caught.)
I was in Senegal on 25 March, with Frank
McLaughlin, President of the Maritime
Fishermen’s Union (MFU), when the
agreement with the Europeans was
signed. This agreement preoccupied not
only our hosts, CNPS, but the entire nation.
One wry observer from the fishing
community of Mbour quipped, “These
Europeans send us their ‘vaches folles’
(mad cows) and then they take away our
yaboye in return.”
As far as we could see, the Senegalese
citizens were not going to take it lying
down. It will remain a significant
challenge for CNPS to keep the issue in the
public eye and to shame the authorities in
Dakar and Brussels into revising an
agreement that is a travesty of
North-South co-operation.
We know the follies of industrial fishery
and we know the powerful forces that
back these fleets. Our own MFU represents
the small-boat inshore fishers of the
Maritime provinces of Canada (including
Newfoundland). Our fishers joined the
MFU in the late 1970s, having experienced
the decimation of their herring stocks over
the previous decade by industrial herring
seiners, not from Europe or the US, but
from our own Pacific coast.
In our case, the inshore fishers won a
partial victory against the seiners, but only
after the resource had been devastated
and the seiners made effectively bankrupt.
It is to the credit of the MFU that we now
have them contained. Yet we have no
illusions about the difficulties of getting
this type of fleet under control before the
resource is completely fished out. The
Senegalese can not afford to wait for the
industrial seiners to go bankrupt and then
move on—the yaboye is too vital to the
country’s food supply and to the coastal
economy.
Forming alliances
With its extensive network of members
and supporters, CM’S should build up a
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campaign and form alliances with other
progressive forces. The eventual result
may be success on the yaboye issue.
In my opinion, however, it will not bea one-dimensional fight. Althoughthe fact of Europeans grabbing food
from Africans is scandalous, the issue will
be downplayed by the authorities,
politicians and experts. The quantities of
fish caught will be minimized in the
European Parliament, while the
trade-offs wilt be trumpeted.
Foreign fishing in Senegalese waters is a
long-term issue for CNPS, one of many
that it, as a fishers’ organization, has to
deal with. The growth and organizational
strength of CNPS is much more important
that any other issue, including the
European fishing agreements that target
small pelagics.
For now, though, what is more vital is
how CM’S builds up the yaboye issue to
also gain support amongst its members
and the fishing communities, from St
Louis to Cassamance. The Government of
Senegal itself is not monolithic. CNPS
needs not only to confront it, but work
with leaders and technocrats who display
goodwill.
It is easy for an outsider to romanticize
the struggles of someone else, but
fishworkers’ supporters can not afford
such indulgence. All our organizations
are vulnerable in the extreme. Members
can be inspired by ideals and solidarity,
but the question of the daily bread and
butter is always on their minds. We suffer
the contradictions of all primary
producer organizations. We have staff
and volunteers who work in conditions of
insecurity, sometimes with little pay and
facing conflicting demands on time and
emotions. Burnout is widely prevalent,
delusion never far-off.
To borrow a saying from the world of
sport, “You have to stay within yourself.’
This is true for the CNPSs and MFUs of this
world. Our strength and value come from
remaining independent and broadbased,
all the while recognizing that any single
issue has the potential to sap our
strengths and our complexities. As a
westerner, I could only dimly sense the
strength and complexity of Senegal and
CNPS. History, after all, does not exist in
textbooks—it is all around. One moment,
the radio blares Celine Dion into the
fishermen’s huts ten paces from the fish-
landing sites on beaches where old
donkeys haul the fish in carts.
The next moment, Babou Mal, a West
African Bob Dylan, wails an inspirational
ode to Africa, to the sounds of the ancient
cora, As the herds of sheep grow in
number on the crowded streets, wending
their way daily into the market to be sold
or sacrificed, you can sense the
approaching feast of Tabaski.
On the outskirts of Dakar is the fisheries
centre, CRODT, which charts fish habitats
with digital satellite tracking, while the
fishers of Guet Ndar plot their moves as
surely as the Three Wise Men in search of
Baby Jesus.
Lamine, a CNPS supporter, evokes the
colonial past as he describes the days he
used to wait at the gate of the peanut oil
plant to be called in for a day’s work.
Nearby, the French maintain a military
base. My colleague spends the afternoon
on lie Goree, at the mouth of Dakar’s
harbour, where the old quarters for
millions of African slaves en route to
America has been preserved as a museum.
The history, dignity and civility of the
Senegalese people grows on you at every
encounter, where the greeting
“Salamalikum” is followed by a string of
exchanges about each other’s health, and
that of the family, a prayer to Allah and a
parting “Inshallah.”
The civility is evident in the one-year old
child who can not yet walk, but greets the
stranger with a handshake and a smile.
The act of sharing from a common bowl of
rice and fish, yams, manioc and cabbage is
spiced with a gentleness in the pace of
eating. The fish is carefully separated from
the bones and the food is discretely
directed to your corner of the bowl, when
your supply is diminishing.
Eke out a living
Though I had been to Senegal twice
earlier, never before had I been struck by
how hard every one works to eke out a
living, to make life civil and bearable. The
government seems so distant from daily
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life, be it in matters of basic maintenance
of sewage pipes or in disbursing old-age
pensions.
The state seems to be widely viewed as a
burden to be endured, feeding off an
already overburdened population. Then
there is the problem caused by the Sahel,
the creeping desert that is driving more of
the population to the overcrowded fishing
areas.
In Senegal, we were received in common
cause, as fellow warriors of inshore
fishers, acknowledged friends, speaking
in the same tongue about the problems of
the fishery. All of us know that the
common foe is not just ‘out there’. It exists
in the cost of fuel doubled by the
devaluation of the Senegal franc, and in
the incessant need to pay off the mortgage
on the pirogue.
It also exists in the glut of fish that can not
be handled by the local infrastructure. The
enemy exists in the credit union that plays
favourites and blacklists the family with
the wrong name, a union that is controlled
by the local politician for political gain and
economic reward.
The enemy is also the foreign trawler that
rams into the pirogue in the dark of night,
within the exclusive six-mile limit. It is in
the sea itself, as the pirogue loaded with
fish and a dozen crew members
approaches the beach landing site and is
suddenly overwhelmed by an
unexpectedly large wave.
The enemy can even be found in the
academies of Dakar, France or Canada
which make the young ignorant of their
society and impotent in the face of social
reality. It lies in the legacy of polygamy
and the empty grandeur that builds a
massive Marriot President Hotel replete
with golf courses but no guests.
The enemy sits in the World Bank, which
declares the vital rail link between St.
Louis and Dakar obsolete—let them walk,
so the Bank seems, to say. The enemy
drives the pirogue owner to burn out
fishers by 35 years of age, and the Korean
super trawler that takes the pirogues on
board and pilots, them to fishing grounds
far from the coast and then discharges
them at sea, with no compasses or radios.
The Senegalese fishery is one of the
world’s most productive, landing a
quarter of a billion tonnes of fish a year,
but it strains under impossible burdens. It
has to support a population driven from
the land by desertification, and excluded
from the workforce by the international
division of labour. It has to support 60,000
fishermen and women and another
240,000 shore workers. To ask it to support
a bloated, overcapitalized European fleet
is to invite the wrath of God.
Of course, we Canadians would never
demand as much from our fishery. Of
course not, that is why our coastal
communities recently vented their wrath
on the governing Liberals, while the cities
in the centre of the country
overwhelmingly voted them back to
office. No, I would say there is much that
coastal communities everywhere have to
say to one another. Yaboye is the people’s
food—for the people it must remain.
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This piece is written by Michael
Belliveau, executive secretary,
Maritime Fishermen’s Union, New
Brunswick, Canada
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Subsidies cut
In early June, at the end
of a two-day workshop
on policy
recommendations for
sustainable fisheries, the
World Wide Fund for
Nature (WWF) and the
United Nations
Environment
Programme (UNEP)
jointly called for a
reduction of over US $50
billion in subsidies.
These were meant to be
spent annually by
nations worldwide in
excess of fish harvest
revenues. The
organizations said this
was a major stimulus in
encouraging
uncontrolled
over-competitive fishing
that depletes fish stocks.
Behave!
The New England
Fishery Management
Council has mooted a
voluntary, non-building
Code of Conduct to be
discussed by a
Responsible Fishing
Committee. The
proposed code urges
commercial fishermen
to protect the fishery
resource, ensure
high-quality products,
advance scientific
knowledge, keep
abreast of technological
innovations and
develop mutual respect
and trust. Phew! What a
tall order!
Be responsible     
Self-regulation seems to
be the order of the day.
A couple of months ago,
a coalition of US seafood
associations and
companies announced
the development of a
voluntary set of
‘principles for
responsible fisheries’ to
guide the US seafood
industry in responsible
resource use.
The principles seek to
improve the way
seafood is caught,
processed and
distributed; to ensure
environmentally sound
use of seafood
resources; and to offer
guidance from the
fishing industry to
government managers.
Elements of the fishing
industry adopting these
principles are expected
to co-operate with
government managers
to improve resource us
and management.
And don’t just fish
“It is no longer enough
for fishermen to simply
know how to operate a
boat and catch fish,”
says a recent report on
responsible fishing
prepared for the
Fisheries Council of
Canada. Although
Canada claims to have
one of the most
comprehensive fisheries
management systems in
the world, crises
abound. Witness the
sharp decline in recent
years of stocks of
groundfish on the
Atlantic Coast and
salmon the Pacific Coast.
Canada’s Department of
Fisheries and of
fisheries and Oceans
(DFO) has developed a
new ‘vision’ for the
future management of
Canadian fisheries. This
is based on the concept
of co-operative
management, and is
consistent with the
recommendations
contained in FAO’s
Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries.
The long-term strategy
of the DFO is to transfer
more responsibility for
fisheries management to
the fishing industry,
while maintaining
legislative responsibility
for protecting stocks.
Slamming salmon
On behalf of the David
Suzuki Foundation, the
Friends of Clayoquot
Sound and Greenpeace,
the Sierra Legal Defense
Fund in the US has
prepared a report
entitled Containing
Disaster: Global Lessons
on Salmon Aguaculture
that discusses negative
aspects of salmon
farming. Aquafarmers
may find its contents
interesting, even if
uncomfortably so.
Dear President...
In late May, several
organizations
representing the
interests of fishworkers
in the Philippines sent
an open letter to
President Fidel V.
Ramos. It urged Ramos
to undo the disastrous
effects of the 22-year old
presidential Decree 704,
promulgated to fully
exploit the Philippines’
fishery resources. The
signatories, including
Bigkis Lakas Pilipinas,
specifically asked for
reforms to protect
mangroves and
fishworkers’ rights.
They also demanded
priority for fisherfolk
co-operatives in fish
pond lease agreements.
Scot-free-for now 
Vessels from Namibia
found fishing illegally
in South African waters
may yet escape the arms
of the law, since the
current laws on marine
fisheries do not provide
for punitive measures
against such offenders.
Sihaleni Ndjaba,
Namibia’s acting
permanent secretary for
fisheries, was reported
by Xinhua News
Agency as saying that
the country was
planning new
legislation under which
Namibian vessels
spotted in other
territorial waters would
be fined or impounded.
Hol(e)y war
The European Union’s
plan to manage the
region’s fisheries
through regulating the
mesh size of nets has
invited the wrath of
fishermen. Hundreds of
News Round-up
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striking French
fishermen blocked
several Channel ports,
crippling traffic to and
from Dunkirk, Calais
and Boulogne in late
April. The fishermen
were protesting EU
regulations increasing
mesh size for fixed sole
nets from 80 mm to 120
mm. A French court
ordered the fishermen
to life the blockade. The
fishermen complied, but
only after French
officials promised to
raise fishermen’s
concerns at a meeting of
EU ministers.
Satellite tracking
Those all-seeing eyes of
the Big Brothers up
there in space may soon
help monitor fishing
fleets and avoid fresh
fishing battles in the
waters of Europe.
Using a combination of
Global Positioning
System and satellite
tracking technology,
trials for a new system
have been conducted by
the European
Commission in Brussels.
A similar system is also
being tested out for the
ASEAN region, where a
satellite tracking system
could be more
centralized and thus
much less complex.
Bedding down
Japan, India and an East
European consortium of
nations have joined the
National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric
Administration of the US
to hire a Seattle-based
company, Redmond’s
sound Ocean System
Inc., to conduct
environmental tests to
determine how future
deep Seattle-based
company, Redmond’s
Sound Ocean Systems
Inc., to conduct
environmental tests to
determine how future
deep seabed mining
would disturb sea life
on the ocean floor.
Sock! Pow! Bang!
Around 35 Puerto Rican
fishermen from the
island of Vieques were
reported to have
clashed with troops
aboard six naval vessels
from Belgium and the
Netherlands  anchored
in a popular fishing area
which the fishermen
claimed was reserved
for civilian activities.
The US Navy owns
portions of Vieques and
allows other nations to
conduct exercises there.
Drifting away
The EU Fisheries
Council is considering a
co-financing plan to
convert the swordfish
fishery of Italy away
form drift-net use over
the 1997-1999 period.
The proposed plan
would provide financial
incentives for fishermen
and vessel owners to
encourage them to cease
or modify their drift-net
fishing.
 Herring plant
State and local officials
in Massachusetts, US are
reviewing a proposal by
the Dutch fishing
conglomerate, Parevliet
& Van Der Plas, to
construct and operate a
50,000 sq.ft. processing
plant for herring and
some mackerel at a
state-managed pier in
Gloucester.
About 20,000 tonnes of
herring would be
packed, frozen and
shipped to European
markets annually,
providing an estimated
US $10 million in
economic benefits to the
community.
The Dutch company has
offered to fund the
conversion of
Gloucester vessels for
herring fishing.
Sad sardines
Fishing industry
officials in Japan have
reported that, due to a
severe decline in the
harvest of sardines by
Japanese fishermen,
sardines for canning are
being imported from the
US and Mexico. The
price of sardines in
Japan has thus risen
substantially.
Stop dumping
Over 550,000 tonnes of
discards of edible fish
were dumped into the
North Sea last year,
according to an
assessment report by
the secretariat of the
fifth North Sea
Conference, prepared
for the Intermediate
Ministerial Meeting on
the North Sea in Bergen
in mid-march. That is
roughly equivalent to
the current Danish catch
of sand eel dedicated to
fishmeal and oil
production.
Stuart Barlow, director
general of the
International Fishmeal
and Oil Manufacturers
Association, has called
for control of discards
from the human-grade
fisheries thrown back
into the sea. He said
that this practice
represents enormous
waste of valuable
protein from the North
Sea. If landed, these fish
could help meet the
European demand for
whitefish and would cut
back imports of this
commodity. This would
save the European
countries around US $55
million each year,
according to Barlow.
Oysters for Maoris
An agreement reached
between the
government of New
Zealand and the Treaty
of Waitingi Commission
has given New
Zealand’s Maoris a 20
per cent share of the
oyster catch from the
Foveaux Strait. Oysters
have not yet been
included in the Quota
Management System
agreed in the 1992
Maori fisheries
settlement.
For the current
agreement, the
government bought
quotas from existing
permit holders at a cost
of about US $4.2 million.
The annual revenue
from a 20 per cent share
of the Foveaux Strait
oyster catch is estimated
to be at least US $ 0.7
million.       
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